Who rules when nobody dominates? Centripetal effects and ethnic engineering in divided towns in the Western Balkans

(Tentatively for panels 5, Ethnoregionalist Parties in Central-Eastern Europe or 1, Elections and Parties in Multilevel) In divided societies political moderation is difficult to achieve. The centripetal school of electoral engineering therefore advocates institutions, which foster vote-pooling across ethnic boundaries, as this will provide a premium for candidates with moderate positions on ethnic issues. This would imply that in electoral districts, where none of the identity-based groups is in the position of a numerical majority, and with a majoritarian electoral system, seeking cross-ethnic votes is particularly important. This paper offers an explanatory study of mayor elections in six evenly divided towns in South-East Europe. It shows that strategies and outcomes differ widely. In some cases, political elites resort to strategies of ethnic engineering, in order to alter the ethnic boundaries and/or extend the size of their own community. Elsewhere, they will build party coalitions, sometimes along the line of the centripetalist argument, benefiting moderates, who can pool votes across ethnic lines. In other cases, however, strategic coalitions are formed between radical forces of all sides, or between the parties of the same group, in order to prevent that the local government will depend on cross-ethnic votes. Among the investigated cases, centripetal effects, creating majorities for moderate candidates, were rather the exception than the rule.