Why Do Interest Groups Organize Themselves as They Do? Functional, Political and Institutional Determinants of Organizational Structure

Membership-based interest groups organized at the EU-level are complex entities that require certain organizational structures to aggregate their members’ preferences and efficiently transfer these to policymakers. From a rational point of view, groups are expected to design structures that are aimed at achieving organizational goals. For instance, groups that want to actively involve their constituency have democratic and accountable structures where members have decision-making powers. In contrast, some groups do not invest in engaging with their members but develop organizational capacity to efficiently and professionally interact with policymakers. Whether groups focus on the logic of membership or influence matters for their potential contribution to EU’s democracy. However, we still have little knowledge of the determinants of interest groups’ organizational structure. This paper examines to what extent functional, political and institutional determinants shape the organizational structure of membership-based interest groups. The paper empirically examines these three competing approaches through a large-n survey of the leadership of interest groups active at the EU level. The findings contribute to a better understanding of why some interest groups are more representative and/or politically capable than others and clarifies their varying contribution to democratic systems.