Social Construction Framework and Policy Design: The Case of Czech Political Parties’ Regulation

Contemporary wave of populism is the last crisis that has considerably shaken many consolidated parliamentary democracies. But how have societies and political parties, which are considered as cornerstones of this political regime, reacted to such challenges? We suggest considering this issue in longer time perspective and focus on policy design regulating political parties which is supposed to reflect these reactions. Our paper aims to inquire policy design of political parties’ regulation (goals, rationales, underlying assumptions, rules, tools, implementation structures, allocation of benefits and burdens, etc.) and its dynamics (policy design change) in the Czech Republic, a post-communist country experiencing almost 30 years of liberal parliamentary democracy. Our research was guided by the Social Construction Framework (SCF – Schneider, Ingram, & deLeon 2014) which provided us an excellent policy process framework with helpful theoretical concepts such as policy design, social construction of target populations, and their political power as well as propositions concerning their relations. Our case study of the regulation of Czech political parties addressed the development of the Law No. 424/1991, on political parties and political movements, which represents the central regulation in this area, in-between 1990-2016. We focused on five major novelizations (policy design changes) in 1990, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2004, and 2016 as well as on the Chamber of Deputies, a crucial power center of Czech political system. Using thematic analysis of parliamentary documents, we initially concentrated on identification of policy design elements and dynamics of regulation development. We particularly focused on regulation of economic activities because they not only mirrored well social construction and political power of political parties but they were also the most changed part of the regulation. Then, we focused on identification of arguments used during the legislative process because they provide us information about policy design’s rationales and underlying assumptions. We also considered procedural strategies which were used in this process because they complemented the repertoire of argumentative strategies. Our findings show that the regulation of Czech political parties in economic activities concentrated on four general areas: business activities, control, donations, and state subsidies and that overall policy design is similar to “contenders” one, particularly for parliamentary parties. The policy design dynamics developed rather in an incremental way. There was outlined a general frame of regulation design based on a compromise between regulation of business activities and provision of state subsidies. Particular parts of policy design were adjusted step-by-step by learning and reactions to internal and external shocks. We also observed that more stabilized party system produced less major policy design changes and that consolidation of party system correlates with a broader variety of procedural strategies. The paper contributes to better understanding of the development of parliamentary democracies in post-communist countries and their reactions to parties-related challenges. It also helps us understand how policy process works in Central and Eastern Europe and particularly what are advantages and limits of SCF in one of its first applications not only in this geographic area but also in the field of parties’ regulation.