In this paper I investigate the claim that the All Affected Principle as a principle of democratic inclusion can provide an argument in favour of legitimising the institutionalisation of a representation for future generations in democratic states. This poses a new problem for the Boundary Problem, namely whether its constituent principles can be applied not only between nations but also across generations. Some authors have argued that the All Affected Principle will legitimise the inclusion of future people in the political decision-making process. In this article I discuss the particular challenges of the All Affected Principle in this context. My argument is twofold: Firstly, I distinguish between the two predominant interpretations of the All Affected Principle in literature; the Principle of All Affected Interests and the All Subjected Principle. I then outline the particular challenges that each interpretation faces with regards to future people and discuss their implications for political decision-making. Secondly, I claim that the aforementioned interpretations of the All Affected Principle fail to legitimise any strong forms of representation for future generations like veto powers or voting rights. Instead, the All Affected Principle only prescribes that future generations need to be considered, their arguments heard and their interests be taken into account. Hence, I conclude that any interpretation of the All Affected Principle will only support weak forms of representation for future people in democratic states.
