Form or substance? Member state compliance with EU fiscal rules.

Research has shown that during implementation member states seek to ‘regain control’ of fiscal policy as a core state power by adopting stricter or looser rules than required by the EU. At the same time, we also observe that member states choose legal tools with a different degree of bindingness for complying with EU fiscal rules. As a matter of fact, some member states might opt for an ordinary law, others for a law with stronger legal force than an ordinary law, yet others might even opt for changing the constitution. This paper studies the relationship between the legal tool (form) and the content (substance) through which member states comply with EU fiscal rules. Empirically, I analyse the (compliant) transposition of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (Fiscal Compact) in three countries (France, Germany and Italy). I find different combinations of bindingness and restrictiveness and explain them through the interplay of factors pertaining to European integration, domestic politics, and domestic polity.