A Delicate Balance: Citizens’ Selfish Views on the Equilibrium between Popular Sovereignty and the Rule of Law in Advanced Democracies

The erosion of checks and balances is one of the defining traits of democratic backsliding. Aspiring autocrats in countries like Poland, Hungary or Israel have frequently weakened the powers of the courts vis-à-vis the executive, and they have usually done so in the name of popular sovereignty. In this paper, we explore the tension between the rule of law and popular sovereignty from the citizens’ perspective. Are citizens ready to accept the constraints to popular sovereignty imposed by the rule of law through horizontal accountability mechanisms and judicial independence? Under which circumstances are voters willing to trade-off the rule of law for more popular sovereignty? We explore these questions through an original observational study in 15 European countries that introduces innovative measurement strategies aimed at evaluating citizens’ views of the democratic trade-off between popular sovereignty and the rule of law. This evidence is complemented with two conjoint experiments on judicial review and executive pardons. These experiments reveal that individuals’ self-interest is the key factor that makes citizens more open to trading-off the rule of law by popular sovereignty. This paper contributes to current debates on democratic backsliding by advancing our knowledge about how citizens view the delicate balance between increasingly contested democratic principles such as popular sovereignty and the rule of law.