The Absence of International Aid Effectiveness Principles in Afghanistan: a sub-sector analysis, 2001-2021

Statebuilding in Afghanistan had a contentious start and an even more tumultuous record throughout the twenty-year statebuilding venture up until the fall of Kabul in 2021. Academics and policy actors have revealed pages of empirical insights and postulations on the roots of statebuilding failures in this exceptionally complex country. Analyses at the internal level is given to the endemic problems of security, corruption and weak centralization. Linking these internal level dynamics to external level dynamics, observers have problematized donor-led statebuilding within the over-arching liberal peacebuilding agenda. In this respect, significant attention in literatures has been given to examining the effectiveness of donor programs, and while the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness has received a wealth of critical attention, less scrutiny has discerned how donor commitments to the aid effectiveness principles translated to post-conflict statebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. We charge that to grasp the challenges that donors and the government of Afghanistan faced in establishing a feasible statebuilding agenda, an inquiry linking aid effectiveness with the donors’ statebuilding agenda is essential. By adopting a sub-sector analysis, we find contradictories in aid effectiveness commitments among donors, suggesting a consequential link to the statebuilding project itself. Thus, we hope, this paper adds significance relative to existing scholarship in providing a state-level analysis of donor commitments to Afghanistan, and especially to sub-sector analysis.