While organization theory has been used for some time to explain relations between organizations in the domestic realm, it has only recently been applied to the study of interactions among international organizations (IOs). This paper tests the applicability of arguments based on the Resource Dependence Model (an important theoretical framework used in organization theory) to the study of IOs engaging in collaborative interactions. The arguments generated by the Resource Dependence Model lead to a series of hypotheses linking the degree to which an IO possesses three types of resources (financial resources, degree of expertise, and prestige) to the likelihood that the organization will engage in collaborative projects with others. I also consider the degree of similarity between IO bureaucratic cultures as an explanatory variable for such collaborations. In addition, the hypotheses distinguish between collaborations involving IOs pooling similar types of resources and those exchanging different ones. I test the hypotheses across approximately forty organizations involved in several dozen formal joint projects through the United Nations Development Program Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). I compare the findings based on collaborations in the development realm, under the MDTF umbrella, with those from a previous study I conducted on IOs involved in the anti-corruption realm. I show that while most collaboration in the anti-corruption realm involves the pooling or exchange of expertise, collaborative projects in the MDTF usually consist in pooling and exchange of financial resources. I offer several explanations for the differences in findings between the two cases.
