Beyond Conditionality: Selectorate Theory and the EU’s Struggle to Promote Rule of Law in EU candidate states

In spite of prolonged EU efforts to promote rule of law in the Western Balkans, progress has been slow and uneven. While Europeanisation theories suggest that sustained EU engagement can drive rule of law progress, insights from selectorate theory illuminate the conditions under which EU conditionality may face limitations. Building on this framework, the study suggests that domestic leaderships superficially implement EU-mandated reforms to maintain access to external incentives while keeping intact domestic patronage networks. It focuses on the case of Albania’s rule of law reforms, a country with prolonged engagement with the EU, and in particular, the establishment of the Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK) and the judicial vetting process, two crucial reforms as part of the country´s accession process. The analysis is based on primary and secondary sources in the form of in-depth, semi-structured, elite/expert interviews with influential Albanian and EU actors from civil society, think tanks, media, and politics, as well as EU and international reports, and relevant academic literature. The findings highlight how strategic compliance shapes reform outcomes, exposing the limits of EU conditionality in promoting rule of law in Albania. At the same time, civil society organisations and an impartial public administration could serve as counterweights to elite manipulation, yet their effectiveness in Albania has been limited by capture and politicisation. These insights contribute to a broader understanding of the EU’s evolving approach to enlargement and rule of law promotion across the Western Balkans and possibly beyond.