Explaining the Emergence of Parliamentary Accountability in EU Rule of Law Enforcement

Research on the RoL crisis has focused on governmental non-compliance and EU enforcement; however, the national dimension of RoL enforcement remains largely unstudied. This paper addresses this gap by examining how and why national parliaments (NPs) exercise accountability over EU RoL enforcement in other member states. We systematically map EU NPs activities regarding democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland (2010-2025), distinguishing resolutions and motions (high accountability), focused debates (medium accountability), occasional mentions (low accountability) and absence of activity. We theorise that NPs engage in RoL-enforcement accountability when they perceive sufficient utility (whether to advance national interests via issue-linkage, protect domestic reputations in salient moments, or avoid falling behind peers through diffusion) and refrain when such incentives are low. Findings show that NPs oversight in this area is contingent and strategic, thus contributing to debates on the rationale of RoL enforcement in the EU.