Green Activism in the era of re-democratization: which factors determine the transition from coal towards alternative (greener) energy sources in Poland?

The assumption in much of the environmental politics of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) literature, is that progressive change is more likely to occur under centre-left administrations. Green activists are likely to gain greater access to policy makers, not least because there is typically overlap between environmental NGO and left-liberal party networks. Moreover, in terms of the impetus towards de-carbonization and transition from fossil fuels, left-liberal parties in government are usually more inclined towards compliance with EU norms. However, recent research on both air pollution activism in Poland and the transition from coal towards cleaner energy suggests that explaining progressive reform is more complex than the existing literature implies. Variation in both the efficacy of activists and the pace of change appears to be explained in terms of a myriad of factors, ranging from the dominance of coal in a particular area, the framing of the campaign for energy diversification, and the interaction between local actors (Hermwille et al, 2023). Whilst discussion of ‘democratic backsliding’ has dominated the scholarship on CEE for at least the past decade, what has received less attention is how popular mobilisation and grass roots activism has become ubiquitous, covering a myriad of international as well as domestic issues ranging from climate protest, LGBTQ rights, and support for Ukraine. This is particularly remarkable because the earlier literature on civil society development (during a period of ‘democratisation’) recorded negligible levels of activism and the predominance of semi-professionalised and institutionalised NGOs. Whilst the emergence of such citizen-led activism across the region can be traced back to the anti-neoliberal urban movements that arose in the 2010s in the immediate post EU-accession period, the so-called ‘illiberal turn’ appears to have exacerbated this shift and momentum. What is particularly puzzling is that such progressive activism also appears to have been successful, despite the ascendancy of right-wing populist politicians at national and local levels. How do we explain this? Drawing on air pollution activism in Poland during both the Prawo I Sprawiedliwość / Law and Justice government (2015-2023) and the current Koalicja Obywatelska, KO / Civic Coalition government (since 2023), led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, I argue that notwithstanding the ideological orientation of the party in power locally, three factors appear critical: (i) the particular ‘framing’ of campaigns and actions, (ii) the circulation of new information and data (rather than any particular trends or occurrences), and (iii) the emergence of a new generation of actors and activist strategies.