The EU’s Democratic Backsliding and Its External Costs: Fuelling Illiberalism in the Neighbourhood

This article examines the negative externalities of internal democratic backsliding in the European Union (EU), focusing on how cooperation between illiberal actors within and outside the Union can undermine core dimensions of its external influence. It argues that democratic backsliding not only weakens liberal democratic norms within the EU but also facilitates the export of illiberal state-building strategies beyond its borders. The article advances a theoretical framework outlining three mechanisms through which illiberal cooperation between actors within and outside the EU generates negative external costs: (1) the transfer of tested illiberal practices and legitimising narratives; (2) the provision of external legitimation for illiberal policies in candidate countries; and (3) strategic protection within EU institutions. The article analyses Hungary-Georgia relations through qualitative content analysis. It demonstrates how such cooperation enables candidate governments to frame illiberal policies as compatible with European norms, thereby undermining the EU's democtatic legitimacy in the neighbourhood and reducing domestic political costs associated with an illiberal turn in candidate states.