On corporate litigation as political influence: Empirical insights from EU Intellectual Property

Strategic litigation rarely occurs in a vacuum. This paper analytically and empirically situates litigation as part of a broader EU advocacy toolkit, built on the premise that interest groups in the EU combine multiple advocacy channels – including public communications, lobbying, and litigation – to optimise chances at success. It focuses in particular on the interplay between litigation and political lobbying by one type of interest group actor: a corporate “multi-venue player”. Using IP policy – and the framework on Supplementary Protection Certificates – as the empirical lens, the paper unpacks how EU litigation and lobbying operate as interdependent actions in a multi-venue advocacy game to secure business profitability. Drawing on insights from elite interviews and qualitative case law analysis, it examines the ways in which these litigation strategies are set up – and by which constellation of players – revealing the nuanced interplay of litigation and lobbying in the development of the legislative framework. Ultimately, the findings not only shed light on the nature of corporate strategic litigation, but also demonstrate the instrumental value of EU litigation across the policy-cycle, as agenda-setting or policy-making tool moving beyond its framing as a mere last resort mechanism.