From external incentives to internal political will: Explaining formal convergence between the candidate countries and the EU social acquis

What explains the formal convergence between the candidate countries and the EU social acquis? This paper measures the degree of legal harmonization of seven candidate countries in the area of social policy since annually between their signing of the association agreements and 2024. Drawing on this original dataset, two case studies are investigated in a comparative analysis. North Macedonia has undergone a lengthy process of formal convergence with gradual harmonization, while Georgia has shown the sharpest increase in the convergence scores among the seven countries. At the same time, the final 2024 convergence scores show similar outcomes for both countries. Consequently, the paper qualitatively explores competing hypotheses explaining the formal convergence including external incentives, political will and government policy preferences, mobilization around the national identity, and the informal veto players. The paper shows that credibility of external incentives, although of critical importance, as well as mobilization around national identity can not only accelerate but also hinder the process of convergence. Political will and government policy preferences, however, is a stable factor offering insights into the dynamics of formal convergence. Furthermore, even in the context of political will, presence of informal veto-players is a significant obstacle that can potentially hollow out reforms. As a result, the paper argues that domestic context in the candidate countries trumps the external incentives model. Credibility of the membership promise can potentially scare governments unwilling to implement democratic reforms, which would loosen their grip on power.