The Normative Boundaries of Access: Lobbyists and the Far Right in the European Parliament

The increasing presence of far-right parties in democratic institutions has intensified debates about their political normalisation and the conditions under which other actors choose to engage with them. While research has largely focused on voters and party competition, far less is known about how interest groups respond to the far right. Yet interest groups constitute central intermediaries in representative democracies, and their decisions to interact with far-right actors influence patterns of representation and legitimacy. This paper examines how professional norms shape lobbyists’ engagement with far-right Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). It employs a preregistered vignette experiment in which EU lobbyists are randomly assigned to scenarios depicting different normative environments: widespread engagement with far-right MEPs, widespread rejection, or a neutral setting. Participants report their willingness to engage, perceived reputational risks, and anticipated benefits. The findings contribute to debates on strategic versus normative logics in interest-group behaviour and the broader dynamics of far-right normalisation.