The academic literature on Eastern Europe has long been dominated by debates over 'democratic backsliding', the rise of radical right and populist movements, and the illiberal turn in states once considered securely on the path to democratic consolidation. These trends have been explored comparatively and from multiple perspectives, including most recently 'from below' (Vachudova et al., 2024). Yet the regional picture is neither uniform nor unidirectional.
Poland's 2023 election of Civic Platform under Donald Tusk represents a striking countercase: a state actively committed to restoring liberal democracy after eight years of populist state capture. The Baltic states, meanwhile, have consistently resisted far-right lurches without exhibiting meaningful backsliding. Conversely, Slovakia's return to populist and far-right conservative governance after a brief liberal democratic interlude illustrates how fragile such recoveries can be. These divergent trajectories raise fundamental questions about the conditions under which re-democratisation becomes possible and sustainable.
This paper interrogates whether 're-democratisation' constitutes a coherent analytical concept and what such a process entails in practice. It examines the actions taken by governments attempting to reverse backsliding, identifying key enablers and spoilers, and assessing the enduring effects of post-1989 transitional legacies. Finally, it reflects on what lessons, if any, can be drawn for states such as Hungary or the Western Balkans that remain locked into authoritarian trajectories, and what distinguishes those polities that have successfully changed course.
