The Effects of Strategic Voting on the New Radical-Populist Parties' Performance. Evidence from the 2024 Parliamentary Elections in Romania

The organization of the 2024 parliamentary elections one week after the first round of the presidential elections transformed the latter into a determining factor of the result of the first, with the emergence of the far-right antisystem candidate Călin Georgescu as the winner of the first round (independent, 23%) and with the distancing of the established nationalist-populist candidate, George Simion (AUR, 14%). The subsequent parliamentary elections in Romania consequently marked a critical juncture in the consolidation of a new wave of radical-populist parties, most prominently the Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor (AUR, 18%), alongside newer challengers – SOS Romania (7%), ideologically and strategically close to Georgescu, and the Partidul Oamenilor Tineri (POT, 6%), directly supporting and being supported by Georgescu. This paper asks whether the two new radical-populist actors, SOS and POT, were penalized by strategic voting dynamics—traditionally expected to disadvantage smaller or ideologically extreme parties—or whether they instead benefited from strategic coordination within the anti-establishment camp and of the ”Georgescu effect”. I use a qualitative research methodology consisting of 39 semi-directive interviews with the two types of Georgescu’s voters at the 24 November presidential elections: those who directly or indirectly followed their presidential candidate, casting a vote for POT or SOS Romania in the 1 December elections, and those who strategically preferred to vote for the dominant party of their camp, AUR. Preliminary findings suggest a differentiated impact of strategic voting. On the one hand, the two smaller and newer radical-populist formations appear to have suffered from viability concerns, with some voters shifting toward the more established AUR as the perceived “sure bet” within the anti-system camp. This pattern indicates that strategic considerations did not uniformly benefit all radical-populist actors but may have facilitated consolidation around the most credible challenger. On the other hand, fears of wasted votes did not translate into a broad return to mainstream parties; instead, strategic logic often operated within the radical-populist spectrum rather than across the systemic divide. The paper argues that in the 2024 parliamentary elections, radical-populist parties were neither clear victims nor unequivocal beneficiaries of strategic voting. Rather, strategic behavior contributed to an internal hierarchy within the radical-populist field, strengthening actors capable of projecting viability while marginalizing peripheral competitors. In this sense, strategic voting functioned as a mechanism of selective consolidation rather than systemic exclusion. By situating the Romanian case within broader debates on populism, electoral thresholds, and party system fragmentation in Central and Eastern Europe, the study refines our understanding of how institutional incentives and political narratives interact. It demonstrates that in contexts of widespread anti-establishment sentiment, strategic voting may reinforce rather than undermine radical-populist representation—provided that at least one actor is perceived as electorally viable and politically consequential.