Thursday 09:30 - 11:00 CET (10/12/2026) Building: Social Science Department, Room: T2
Abstract
The Bolivian dictatorship that seized power on 17 July 1980 is conventionally read as one more national-security regime of the Southern Cone. That reading captures the repression and state terrorsim, but misses what set it apart. Under Luis García Meza and his interior minister, Luis Arce Gómez, the cocaine trade
was not something the state tolerated at its margins or merely protected for a cut. It became the substance of how the state governed.
Drawing on the US prosecution of Arce Gómez, read critically against US and Latin American diplomatic and intelligence records, the paper reconstructs how this system worked. At its center stood the Ministry of the Interior. Ministerial credentials gave selected traffickers exclusive rights over a given zone; differentiated tariffs fixed what they paid to move cocaine along each export route. A paramilitary organization enforced the terms, collected the payments, and redistributed the cocaine it confiscated from those outside the system. The regime did not shield an economy it stood outside of. It ran that economy, pricing and taxing it as a treasury would any other source of revenue.
Placed in the late inter-American Cold War, the Bolivian case complicates any clean distinction between the state and organized crime: coercion, administration, and the drug trade operated less as rival powers than as functions of a single apparatus. It also shows how organized crime can become a constitutive dimension of governance when political crisis, military violence, and transnational support converge.