Thursday 11:30 - 13:00 CET (10/12/2026) Building: Social Science Department, Room: T2
Abstract
The proliferation of digital payment intermediaries in Latin America has transformed the financial infrastructure available to both legal and illegal enterprises. While AML regulation formally subjects these intermediaries to equivalent obligations as traditional financial institutions, regulatory scope often lags behind, creating exploitable gaps for criminal organizations.
Drawing on judicial and media sources, this paper presents a case study of how Brazil's Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) systematically exploited such a gap to launder illegal proceeds. Until 2025, Brazilian tax regulations did not require payment institutions to report transactions, which allowed the PCC to build a network of fintech intermediaries around this asymmetry, channeling funds through pooled accounts ("contas-bolsão") held at traditional banks. An unsuccessful attempt to close this gap in 2024 was reversed amid public backlash, and only after the PCC's fintech network was exposed through the Carbono Oculto operation (2025) was the regulatory gap finally closed. However, the organization reconstituted its financial infrastructure around a new set of fintech intermediaries, later exposed in the Fluxo Oculto operation (2026).
Drawing on the Regulator-Intermediary-Target (RIT) framework (Abbott et al., 2017), the paper analyzes this cycle of adaptation, arguing that the PCC's financial strategy reveals organized crime as an active and rational agent that responds to shifts in monitoring stringency and relative risks of alternative financial intermediaries. The case contributes to the broader discussion on regulatory arbitrage in retail-level illegal markets, and opens avenues for future comparative work on Argentina and Mexico, within the framework of the REGULA research project.