Friday 16:45 - 18:15 CET (11/12/2026) Building: Social Science Department, Room: I.2
Abstract
Over the past decade, the expansion of organized crime has become one of the most pressing threats to Latin American states and their democracies. Once considered primarily a problem of weak states, criminal influence now extends to stronger countries in the region and even the advanced European welfare states. This paper examines the relationship between organized crime and democracy. It interrogates and unpacks how these groups undermine democratic institutions. We explore several dimensions of this dynamic, including criminal groups' influence on electoral campaigns, candidate selection, and campaign financing. We also explore how criminal groups affect policy design and implementation, often through corruption, coercion, or the establishment of criminal governance in areas of weak or compromised state presence. We develop a framework to understand the mechanisms through which organized crime interacts with political systems, while proposing the construction of indicators to advance comparative research on the evolving relationship between criminality and democracy. By adopting a broader perspective that moves beyond the dominant focus on drug trafficking and vertically integrated cartels, the study highlights the diversified and transnational nature of illicit markets. The analysis concentrates on least likely cases, that is, countries with relatively stronger democratic institutions and weaker, less sophisticated criminal syndicates, including Chile and Uruguay.