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The regulation of (dis)organized crime and violence: constructing order in Greater Buenos Aires

Latin America
Organised Crime
Corruption
Hernan Flom
Trinity College
Hernan Flom
Trinity College

Friday 16:45 - 18:15 CET (11/12/2026) Building: Social Science Department, Room: I.2


Abstract

The urban periphery of the province of Buenos Aires, commonly referred to as “the Conurbano”, is theoretically ripe for organized crime expansion and high lethal violence. Over the last decade, poverty and marginalization have continuously increased. Most state agencies are present in name only. Drug consumption and distribution are often ubiquitous. However, drug gangs (“bandas”) in the Conurbano have a minimal presence in and beyond their turf. Furthermore, despite abundant instances of nonlethal violence (Auyero and Berti 2015; Auyero and Servián 2024), homicides have decreased and overall rates in the province are relatively low. This outcome clashes with the expectation that more fragmented and less sophisticated criminal groups would result in more deadly violence. What explains this relative order? We argue that the informal regulation by the provincial police, combined with increased security resources allocated by municipal governments, sustain this tense equilibrium. While lacking in various measures of professionalization, the police’s territorial reach and credible coercive capacity can neutralize both clashes between criminal groups and attempts by gangs to extend their dominance. Meanwhile, municipal mayors have increasingly become the focal point for security concerns. Subsequently, they have invested heavily in police equipment, infrastructure, and surveillance mechanisms to prevent or respond to violent crime. We base our findings on extensive ethnographic studies of marginalized neighborhoods and in-depth interviews with subnational (state and local) public officials. Our paper thus questions the conditions under which criminal governance – of different types – develops and the circumstances when criminal violence emerges in urban peripheries.