Friday 13:30 - 14:15 CET (11/12/2026) Building: Social Science Department, Room: I.I
Abstract
Democratization literature portrays land inequality as bad for democratization, with landowners opposed to labor/peasant unions and the urban middle class. However, less attention has been devoted to the coalition between landowners and criminal organizations and its impact on the persistence of land inequality and defective democratic development. Using historical and quantitative, local-level evidence from Sicily, we demonstrate how a coalition of surviving landowners, complicit politicians, and mafia killers successfully blocked the implementation of land reforms, with long-term consequences. We examine the causal relationship between municipalities with higher rates of mafia-committed homicides of the heads of the peasant movement (trade union leaders, socialist/communist mayors, and labor chamber presidents; instrument, 1861–1962), land redistribution following the land reforms (treatment, 1943–1962), and weaker quality of government in the present (outcome, 2001–2021). We use original data on mafia homicides and implementation of the land reforms, triangulated with official sources and case-based literature. Our analysis highlights how the negative influence of land inequality on democratization is exacerbated by criminal organizations supporting the agrarian bloc and repressing popular movements fighting for redistribution.