Friday 13:30 - 14:15 CET (11/12/2026) Building: Social Science Department, Room: II.1
Abstract
The levels and types of violence associated with the transnational cocaine supply chain vary considerably in Latin America and Europe. Despite playing a similar role in the cocaine trade (as measured by annual cocaine seizures relative to port traffic volume), the homicide rate in Colombia's port city of Buenaventura is ten times higher than of Santos, in Brazil, and the homicide rate in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, is four times higher than that of Gioia Tauro, in Italy. Taking port cities across the Atlantic as our analytical unit, we ask: why do similarly important cocaine transit ports exhibit such different levels of drug-related violence? We address this question through two paired case comparisons, enabling analysis both within and across cases of four major cocaine transit ports (Santos in Brazil, Buenaventura in Colombia, Rotterdam in the Netherlands and Gioia Tauro in Italy). Existing accounts primarily attribute drug violence to competition among criminal groups, or to the actions or inaction of states. We argue instead that the level of violence depends on the forms of co-created governance that emerge between criminal organisations and state actors along the cocaine supply chain. Preliminary evidence suggests that violence is lower where criminal organisations and state actors converge around relatively stable governance arrangements. Therefore, our paper sheds light on the varying dynamics of drug-related violence in Latin America and Europe by developing the concept of co-created governance of crime — the ways in which authorities and/or criminals limit competition and regulate drug trafficking activities to keep violence under control.