Thursday 09:30 - 11:00 CET (10/12/2026) Building: Social Science Department, Room: Aula Ovale
Abstract
The literature on militarization in Latin America generally explains the use of the armed forces in public security through the growth of violence, the expansion of organized crime, or the ideological preferences of governments. However, these explanations have difficulty accounting for why militarization policies persist even when significant changes occur in the ideological orientation of political leadership. This paper seeks to answer the following question: Why do ideologically divergent governments converge on militarized responses to organized crime?
To address this, the study employs Policy Feedback Theory (PFT) as its analytical framework and develops a comparative analysis of Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador. The analysis focuses on governments representing distinct political positions, ranging from conservative administrations to progressive ones, which nevertheless maintained, expanded, or deepened the participation of the armed forces in internal security tasks.
The paper argues that the persistence of militarization is not primarily explained by the ideology of political leaders, but rather by institutional feedback mechanisms that generate path dependence and processes of institutional lock-in. These mechanisms operate through positive and negative feedback, legal constraints, the strengthening of military institutions, the consolidation of power groups that benefit from the policy, and the formation of public agendas that privilege coercive responses to organized crime. As a result, militarization evolves into a self-reinforcing policy whose reversal entails high political and institutional costs.
The article contributes to the study of organized crime, security, and governance by shifting analytical attention away from the origins