Electoral Resilience: Manipulation, Chaotic Effects, and Polarization
Elections
Populism
Electoral Behaviour
Abstract
Democratic resilience depends on elections remaining effective mechanisms of representation, accountability, and peaceful transfers of power. Electoral rules shape this capacity by determining how votes translate into offices and structuring the incentives of parties, candidates, and voters. This section examines electoral resilience as a component of democratic resilience: the capacity of electoral institutions to sustain fair competition, responsive representation, and legitimate outcomes under pressure. It focuses on three threats arising from the design and operation of electoral rules: partisan manipulation, chaotic effects, and polarization.
First, electoral rules can become instruments of partisan entrenchment. Gerrymandering is one manifestation of a broader problem encompassing changes to electoral formulas, district magnitudes, assembly sizes, statutory thresholds, ballot access, and electoral timing. The section asks which institutional arrangements facilitate such manipulation, how its effects can be identified, and which safeguards constrain it. Particular attention will be paid to the governance of electoral reform, including constitutional constraints, independent institutions, judicial review, and requirements for agreement across parties.
Second, electoral rules can generate chaotic effects, understood here as large political consequences of small changes in votes. Statutory thresholds provide a particularly clear example: a narrow difference in vote shares can determine whether a party receives no seats or an entire parliamentary delegation, as illustrated by the narrow exclusion of Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) from the Bundestag in 2025. Comparable discontinuities can arise from majority bonuses, seat-allocation rules, and qualification for subsequent rounds. Such sensitivity raises the stakes of counting errors and disputed ballots and gives political actors greater scope to claim that limited fraud or error changed the distribution of power. The section examines how to measure these effects, assess their frequency and magnitude, and reduce their consequences while preserving electoral responsiveness.
Third, electoral rules can create incentives that intensify polarization. The section examines when two-round presidential elections encourage antagonistic competition between opposing camps and when particular variants of proportional representation reward ideological differentiation or divisive mobilization. It considers ideological and affective polarization, the behavior of parties and candidates, and voters’ willingness to recognize opponents as legitimate competitors. Central questions concern the mechanisms connecting electoral institutions to polarization, the conditions under which these mechanisms operate, and the scope for institutional designs that encourage broader appeals and cooperation.
These threats interact. Partisan reforms may exploit electoral discontinuities or reinforce polarization, while polarized competition may strengthen incentives to manipulate rules or reject electoral defeat. Addressing one vulnerability may also create another: thresholds intended to limit fragmentation can magnify the consequences of small vote changes, while measures that stabilize outcomes can weaken responsiveness. The section therefore seeks to identify both institutional safeguards and the tradeoffs among robustness, inclusion, accountability, and effective government.
We welcome theoretical, comparative, historical, experimental, and computational contributions, including formal models and simulations. Papers may examine executive or legislative elections at national or subnational levels across different democratic contexts. Contributions should connect the properties or effects of electoral institutions to their capacity to sustain democratic competition.
Potential panels include:
1. Partisan Manipulation and the Governance of Electoral Reform
This panel examines strategic changes to electoral formulas, thresholds, district magnitudes, ballot access, and electoral timing. It considers how to distinguish legitimate reform from partisan entrenchment and evaluates constitutional, judicial, and procedural safeguards. Contributions may investigate both the adoption of electoral reforms and their subsequent implementation.
2. Gerrymandering, Apportionment, and Electoral Geography
This panel addresses boundary manipulation, malapportionment, and the interaction between electoral rules and the geographic distribution of political support. It welcomes methods for identifying partisan advantage and distinguishing deliberate manipulation from structural effects, alongside assessments of independent redistricting, transparent procedures, and alternative districting arrangements.
3. Thresholds, Electoral Margins, and Outcome Sensitivity
This panel investigates how small changes in votes affect seat allocations, parliamentary majorities, and access to subsequent electoral rounds. Themes include statutory thresholds, majority bonuses, electoral margins, and measures of local and aggregate sensitivity. Contributions may compare existing systems or develop reforms that reduce abrupt changes in representation.
4. Electoral Errors, Fraud Allegations, and the Acceptance of Results
This panel connects institutional sensitivity to the political consequences of counting errors, disputed ballots, and allegations of fraud. It examines recounts, audits, dispute resolution, and public communication, asking how electoral institutions can support credible verification and acceptance of results when relatively few votes have substantial consequences.
5. Presidential Elections, Runoffs, and Polarization
This panel examines how rules for electing presidents shape candidate positioning, alliances, campaign strategies, and hostility between opposing electorates. Particular attention will be paid to two-round systems, the relationship between competition across rounds and polarization, and comparisons with alternative electoral rules. Papers should identify conditions that encourage antagonism or broader electoral appeals.
6. Proportional Representation and Polarizing Incentives
This panel investigates how variants of proportional representation shape ideological differentiation, affective hostility, and cooperation among parties. Themes include district magnitude, electoral formulas, thresholds, ballot structure, and competition within and between parties. It asks which institutional combinations intensify polarization and which sustain pluralistic competition compatible with democratic resilience.