Governments, firms and experts now justify their positions on artificial intelligence (AI) with arguments about time. AI developers publish forecasts of when transformative systems will arrive. Washington presents its controls on advanced chip exports as a way to buy years of lead over Beijing. Middle powers in Europe and Asia fear that they will have to adopt rules written on someone else’s schedule. Arms control experts point out that verification has usually trailed the weapons it governs by decades.
This Section studies these arguments about time as political tools. Forecasts, deadlines and race narratives decide which actors gain authority, which policies look necessary and which states appear to lag. Political science research on AI has mostly examined the content of rules. The timing arguments used to justify those rules have received far less study. The Section draws on international relations, public policy and political theory to close this gap. It welcomes quantitative, qualitative and historical work.
Panel 1. Forecasting and urgency in AI governance. Governments, AI developers and international organisations all produce forecasts of AI capabilities. This Panel asks when such forecasts gain authority in policy debates. It also examines how race narratives between the United States and China justify exceptional measures.
Panel 2. Export controls and the decay of technological leverage. Controls on advanced chips and cloud computing aim to slow rival states. Targeted states respond by building substitutes. Papers in this Panel ask how long technological leverage lasts and what enforcement does to that timeline.
Panel 3. Verification lag: lessons from arms control for AI. Nuclear, chemical and biological arms control each needed years to build trusted monitoring. This Panel compares those histories with current proposals for international AI agreements. It asks which verification tools states could agree on before capabilities outpace them.
Panel 4. Whose clock? Middle powers, the Global South and unequal timelines. Catch-up narratives and national “sovereign AI” programmes place many states on a schedule set elsewhere. This Panel examines how regional organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union respond. It also asks when such states gain a voice in setting the pace of global rules. Potential Chair: Jonas Kgomo (Equiano Institute).
Panel 5. Catastrophic risk, future generations and long-term institutions. International institutions find it hard to weigh rare but catastrophic risks against present needs. This Panel studies designs for institutions that plan beyond electoral cycles, from foresight units to treaty review mechanisms.
We will choose Chairs for Panels 1, 2, 3 and 5 from experienced Paper givers in the Section. We will select Papers to balance gender, region and career stage. We will give particular attention to doctoral researchers and to scholars based outside Western Europe.