ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY WITHIN PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY WITHIN STATES: THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPATION, COMPETITION AND REPRESENTATION

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ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY WITHIN PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY WITHIN STATES: THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPATION, COMPETITION AND REPRESENTATION*

The perception that democracy within parties is similar to democracy within states stands at the basis of the well-known Iron Law of Oligarchy proposed by Robert Michels (1968 [1915]). His major claim is that if democracy cannot be realized even within those parties that raise the banner of democracy – within the Socialist mass parties, especially the German one – then it also cannot be realized at the level of the state, which contains undemocratic and pre-democratic forces. Another approach that sees democracy within the two systems (the party and the state) in similar terms is the one that claims that democracy within states is dependent upon democracy within parties. Such an approach is almost as old as modern democracy itself, and appeared as far back as the United States during the 19th century, expressed by the “… Jacksonian ethos that parties were the means of effecting democracy, and any redesign of them had to be directed toward maximizing participation within them” (Ware 2002: 255). This approach was championed by the Progressive movement at the beginning of the 20th century, and appears to be at the root of the demand of the supporters of participatory democracy for deepening the involvement of citizens in party politics.

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The above approaches presume not only that there is a direct link between democracy within parties and democracy within states, but also that increased participation necessarily leads to an increase in the fulfillment of democracy in general. But is this really the case? This study examines the relationships between participation and two additional democratic dimensions: competition and representation. Together with participation, political competition is part of even the most minimal definition of democracy (Schumpeter 1943). Representation, meanwhile, is a central element in modern democracy, which is representative democracy. One expects that the representative will be similar to the represented: either sociologically (women will represent women, for example), or in terms of their opinions and interests (feminists will represent women, for example). These two kinds of representation, also known as representation of ideas and representation as presence (Philips 1995), are interconnected. It is argued that representation as presence enhances representation of ideas because it ensures that the representatives share the life experience and interests of those that they represent (Katz 1997: 104). Wangnerud’s (2000) study of the Swedish parliament indeed demonstrates that female representatives are the prime representatives of women interests, and thus presence guarantees that interests and ideas will be truly represented.

The first section of this paper examines the ways in which several main studies of democracy addressed the question of the relationships among participation, competition and representation. The second section formulates the research questions and research hypothesis, concentrating on the intra-party arena in which (unlike the state level) participation varies and enables us to check its relationship with both competition and
representation. The third section describes the research population – intra-party candidate selection in Israel between 1949 and 2003 – along with the methodology and the indices for measuring participation, competition and representation. The fourth section presents the findings of our empirical analysis of the relationship between participation and competition, which we find to be non-linear. The fifth section presents the findings of our empirical analysis of the relationship between participation and representation, which we find to be negative. Finally, we attempt to connect our empirical findings on the relationship between participation, competition and representation to the question of the relationship between democracy within parties and democracy within states. This paper suggests that the optimization of democracy requires a division of labor among the two systems.

**The State of the Research**

The research literature on democracies – which is full of discussions of the uneasy relationship within democracy among such values as freedom and equality – has almost nothing to say about the relationship between participation and competition, or the relationship between participation and representation. We could find no empirical analysis of the impact of participation on competition and representation. This should come as no surprise because at the state level, universal suffrage is a democratic prerequisite, thus participation is not a variable because it does not vary. Participation appears as a dependent variable in studies that assess the realization of this universal democratic right – such as studies of electoral turnout. There is, however, extensive literature on turnout that addresses the relationship between competition, representation and turnout. Studies show
that higher level of competition lead to higher turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Franklin 2002; Grofman, Collet and Griffin 1998; Milbrath and Goel 1977). It is also repeatedly shown that voter turnout is higher in PR systems (Blais and Carty 1990; Franklin 2002; Powel 1980).

Most democratic theory does not address the relationships among participation, competition and representation. However, it is possible to identify some implicit assumptions about this in the writing of several prominent scholars. The two legs of Schumpeter’s (1943: 269) minimalist procedural definition of democracy are competition and participation, “…the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” But Schumpeter did not assess the relationship among the two, which leads to the conclusion that he assumed that they were either unrelated, or positively related. Dahl (1971:8) takes the same path, stating “…Polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation.” But, in his case, the basic quadrilateral typology of regimes according to their levels of participation (in terms of inclusiveness) and competition clarifies that he does not see any necessary link between the two.¹ This notion of apparently no relationship is also assumed by Vanhanen (2000: 253) who argues “…that the two most important dimensions of democracy are the degree of competition and the degree of participation.” Michels (1968 [1915]) suggests two explanations for the low rate of intra-partisan competition, i.e. the high rate of

¹ Dahl anticipates that democracies in which competition among elites developed prior to the widening of participation would be more stable than democracies that would increase participation and competition at the same time.
incumbents being re-selected. First, he claims, re-selection is the result of the party elite maintaining control over nominations. Second, the psychology of the masses – their feelings of gratitude and dependency on the leaders – induces the public to reselect incumbent leaders. Thus, for Michels, competition will be low in any case – either a small selectorate will take care of itself or a large one (party members) will repeatedly ratify the position of the elite.

**Research Questions and Research Hypotheses**

Is there a link between participation, competition and representation? If there are any such relationships, what kind of relationships are they? That is, does higher participation lead to higher competition? Does higher participation lead to higher representation? The existence of a relationship among all three variables cannot be properly tested at the state level, where participation remains constant, i.e. universal. These relationships can be assessed in the intra-party arena, in which the level of participation can be limited a–priori. That is, according to the level of the inclusiveness of the selectorate – the body that selects the party’s candidates for public office.

The selectorate can be composed of one person, or several or many people – up to the entire electorate of a given nation. On the inclusiveness to exclusiveness continuum, at one extreme the selectorate is the most inclusive – i.e., the entire electorate that has the right to vote in the general elections. On the other extreme, the selectorate – or rather the selector – is the most exclusive, i.e., a nomination entity of one leader. Between these two extremes, the selectorate of each party can be classified according to its amount of
inclusiveness. Figure 1 presents a continuum concerning the exclusiveness or inclusiveness of the selectorates that are included in this study: the most exclusive is the nomination committee, composed of a few people; the most inclusive selectorate is the party members at large; in the middle there is the selected party agency, composed of party delegates. As will be elaborated later on, we suggest such a continuum in order to capture the complex reality in which several selectorates may take part in candidate selection (Rahat and Hazan 2001). The research question is, therefore: Is there a link between the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the level of competition and representation? If there are such relationships, what kind of relationships are they – positive, negative or more complex?

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The answers to these questions will be central to our understanding of the role of political parties in democracy. Positive relationships between participation, competition and representation will justify the demand for involving members and even supporters in intra-party politics in the name of improving democracy. In other words, the easy answer will be that democracy breeds more democracy. That is, enhanced democracy within parties strengthens democracy at the state level, between parties. But, if the relationships between participation, competition and representation are more complicated, negative and/or nonlinear, then higher participation may exert a price. This could lead to the conclusion that the division of democratic tasks – rather than equivalence at the state and the party levels – could produce “more” democracy. That is, the state should take care of
its obligation to guarantee universal suffrage, while the parties should fine-tune representation and competition.

Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses on the relationship between participation and competition, and between participation and representation.

The first hypothesis is:

• The relationship between participation and competition is non-linear. Medium-sized selectorates (such as party institutions) will be the most competitive selectorates, followed by the more inclusive selectorates (party members) and finally the least inclusive selectorates (nomination committees).

The second hypothesis is:

• The relationship between participation and representation is negative. The more inclusive the selectorate, the less representative the selected list of candidates.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Incumbency is an advantage in all kinds of democratic systems; the differences are in the extent of this advantage. The inclusiveness of the selectorate is likely to affect the success rate of incumbents in their efforts to be reselected, because smaller selectorates allow aspirants a chance to be known and to personally contact their selectors. When the selectorate is inclusive, i.e. composed of party members, support cannot be based on personal affiliations and incumbency is thus likely to supply a larger advantage. This is mainly because as public officials, incumbents enjoy newsworthiness and the ability to
demonstrate responsiveness to the demands both interest groups and to financial donors. The American experience supplies clear evidence on the advantage of incumbents in primaries (a very inclusive selectorate). Between 1978 and 1992, in only 47 cases out of 3166 (1.5%) were incumbents seeking re-election for the House of Representatives defeated in the primaries, and in only 13 cases out of 236 (5.5%) were incumbents seeking re-election for the Senate defeated in the primaries (Jackson 1994). As Maisel and Stone (2001:43) claim “it is clear that primary elections do not serve to stimulate more competition, and to the extent that competition is an essential ingredient of democracy, it is not clear they accomplish their intended purpose of enhancing U.S. democracy.”

A different and separate explanation is needed for the hypothesis that nomination committees will be the least competitive among the three kinds of selectorates. That is, if we accept the logic that party agencies are more competitive than primaries because of the shorter “distance” between the candidates and selectors, then nominations committee are expected to be more competitive than the two other kinds of selectorates. It is easier for each candidate to present himself or herself to each member of the committee than to do the same in the broader party agency. Furthermore, we expected that all positions other than a few at the top – that will be taken by the members of the nomination committee – will be open for competition. However, these two expectations miss an important part of the picture that reverses their outcome. The nomination committee suffers – because of its small size and informal, non-transparent working procedures – from a problem of popular democratic legitimacy. The best strategy for the nomination
committee to legitimize its decisions in the eyes of party agencies, party members and even the general public is to present a list that will largely be composed of incumbents, i.e. a list that reflects the existing balance of power, and will thus not raise much antagonism. Changes will be minimal, only to demonstrate that something was changed, that the nomination committee is not a rubber stamp.

The second hypothesis is that the more inclusive the selectorate, the less representative the selected list. Nomination committees possess substantial control over the composition of the candidate list, and can thus bring concerns over representation into consideration. A large and amorphous selectorate of party members has no such ability to coordinate its behavior in order to produce a representative list. Party agencies have some ability to coordinate selection and thus produce lists that are more representative than those produced by party members, but less than those produced by nomination committees. In other words, smaller exclusive selectorates are able to balance the composition of the candidate list better than larger inclusive selectorates. In the latter, candidates from the dominant group can win most of the safe positions on the list. Women, minorities and candidates from territorial and other social peripheries will find it more difficult to break out of their affiliated groups and will continue to suffer from the vicious circle of non-incumbency.

The uneasy relationship between participation and representation is evident when looking at data on the representation of women in national parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2004). Representation of women is sometimes higher in parliaments of non-
democratic states, where participation is largely symbolic, than in established democracies. Rwanda, for example, is rated first, with 48.8% women MPs, a higher percentage than the famous cases of high representation of women in the democratic Nordic countries. The Cuban parliament, with 36% women, is rated seventh, before most democratic states and more than twice that in the US (14.9%). In the democratic countries, those electoral systems where parties have a greater influence on parliamentary composition vis-à-vis the wider public – closed-list systems and multi-member districts – exhibit higher women’s representation (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994). This suggests that representation can be better served in more controlled environments, such as that of a party with a small nomination committee that “engineers” a complete list of candidates.

Methodology and Measurements

We examined every candidate selection process in almost all the parties that presented candidate lists for a second time or more, since the second election for the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, in 1951 and up to the most recent election in 2003. Data on the selection methods was collected from party regulations, from studies of candidate selection in Israel (Bricha 1977; Goldberg 1994; Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999) and from newspaper. The official candidate lists that were submitted to the Central Election Committee and the results of the candidate selection contests, which were either supplied by the parties or found in their archives, were used for analyzing the political consequences of selection in terms of representation and competition.
1. The Independent Variable: Participation in Candidate Selection

The inclusiveness of each selectorate was estimated on the basis of a 13-point scale. Zero meant that an exclusive selectorate of a few, such as a nominating committee, was allowed to determine both the composition and the rank of the candidate list; 6 meant that a selected party agency, a wider selectorate, was allowed to determine the composition and rank of the candidate list; 12 meant that party members, the widest selectorate ever used in Israeli politics for selecting candidates for the Knesset, were allowed to determine the composition and rank of the candidate list (see Figure 1). The space between these pure types includes the cases in which more than one selectorate was involved in the candidate selection process, and an assessment of the relative influence of each. Then, all the cases that were scored 0-3 were collapsed into the most exclusive category of “nomination committees”; all the cases that were scored 4-8 were collapsed into the median category of “selected party agency”; and all the cases that were scored 9-12 were collapsed into the most exclusive category of “party members”. We end up with three levels of participation – the very few, a limited group, and the party members at large.

In addition, these three levels of inclusiveness also represent three parallel levels of “directness” of participation. The more inclusive a system is, the more we are dealing with “direct” participation. Selection by party members is direct; selection by the members of a selected party agency means that first this limited group has to be selected by the party members; selection by a nominating committee means that candidate

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2 For example, a score of 1 meant that a nominating committee determined the composition and rank of the candidate list, but an en-bloc approval of the candidate list by a party agency was nevertheless needed. This gave the party agency some influence in the process, because the members of the nominating committee had to take its approval into consideration.
selection is conducted by a body whose composition was ratified en-bloc by the members of a selected party agency, who in turn were selected by the party members.

2. The Dependent Variables: Competitiveness and Representation

2A. Competition

Each of the four indices suggested measure a somewhat different aspect of competitiveness. Only the first two can be used to compare selection in all three kinds of selectorates – nominating committees, selected party agencies and party members. The other two indices can be used only for comparing selection in party agencies to selection through party primaries.

The first three indices incorporate a distinction between incumbents and non-incumbents. Two indices check the level of success of non-incumbents in comparison to that of incumbents. Index #1 weights the non-incumbents’ share of positions at the top of the list, while Index #2 ranks their relative positions on the list. A high share of top positions for non-incumbents along with a high ranking indicates a high level of competition. Index #3 checks the supply side, assessing the ratio between the number of competing incumbents and non-incumbents as an indicator of competitiveness. A higher ratio indicates that competition is more appealing to those who are “outsiders” – i.e. to non-incumbents – which suggests that they estimate that they have a chance to win a safe position. Unlike

3 These two measures (unlike measure 3) can be used to analyze selection by a nominating committee because they do not require data on the number of candidates, which is lacking in the case of nomination committees because of their informal nature; and because, unlike the fourth index, they do not require voting results – nomination committees presented their lists as a consensual result of deliberations and not of the aggregation of individual’s votes.
the first three indices, the fourth index disregards incumbency and assesses the concentration of votes at the top as an indicator of competition: the more votes are concentrated, the less there is competition. Altogether, these measures supply a comprehensive overview of competitiveness.

1) Non-Incumbent Winning Index

The index measures the “success” of new candidates according to whether he or she won “an incumbent’s position”. Thus, if 20 incumbent MPs competed for positions on the party list, the entrance of a new candidate up to the 20th position would be considered a success. The definition of incumbent is any candidate that was elected to the previous legislature. The formula is:

\[ \frac{\sum W_{ni}}{\sum Ci} \]

Where

- \( W_{ni} \) is the number of winning non-incumbents who won a position on the list that is equal or higher in rank to the number of competing incumbents in each selection event.
- \( Ci \) is the number of competing incumbents in each selection event.

In case of selection by a party agency or by party members, those incumbents that appeared on the ballot – from which either the members of the selected party agencies or the party members selected their candidates – were considered as trying to win a safe position. In the case of nomination committees there were no such ballots or formal lists of candidates. The task of distinguishing losers from those who willingly retired required the conducting of a small biographical profile on each MP that either disappeared from the official candidate list or appeared in an unsafe position. Newspaper accounts from the
time of the selection, biographies and autobiographies, intra-party material and historical studies helped to fulfill this complex task.

2) Non-Incumbent Weighed Winning Index

Like the former index, this index counts the number of non-incumbents that won “an incumbent’s position,” but unlike the previous index it takes into consideration the relative position that they won, giving higher values to winning higher positions on the list. That is, each position on the list, up to the position that is equal to the number of competing incumbents, is given a value in a descending order – the last position is given one point and each higher position is “worth” an additional point. The formula is:

$$\sum \left( \frac{V_{pni}}{V_{pi}} \times Ci \right) \div \sum Ci$$

$V_{pni}$ stand for the value of the positions won by non-incumbents in each selection event. $V_{pi}$ stand for the total value of the positions in the specific selection event. The value of the victory in each selection event ($V_{pni}/V_{pi}$) is multiplied by the number of competing incumbents in each selection event ($Ci$). The sum is then divided by the sum of the number of competing incumbents in all selection events.

3) Aspirant Index

This index examines how many non-incumbents were motivated to challenge incumbents, by measuring the ratio between “insiders” and “outsiders” competing for safe positions. The higher the index, the more newcomers were motivated to challenge incumbents.
The formula is:

\[ \sum \frac{C_{ni}}{C_i} \]

C_{ni} stands for the number of competing non-incumbents who contended for safe positions.

C_{i} stands for the number of competing incumbents who contended for safe positions on the party list.

A higher value for this index reflects higher competition. It means that the number of non-incumbents who challenged incumbent candidates is relatively high. The sensitivity of this index to the relative size of the party (the number of its incumbents) enables us to sum the values on both sides of the equation for the entire population.

4) Vote Concentration Index

This index examines the amount of votes concentrated at the few candidates on top of the list. The more the votes are dispersed among the candidates, the more competitive the selection event.

The formula is:

\[ \sum \left[ \left( \frac{V_{nv}}{V_t} \right) \times N_v \right] \]

\[ \sum N_v \]

V_{nv} stands for the number of votes won by the candidates in the top positions on the party list that is equal to the number of votes allocated to each selector in each selection event.

V_{t} stands for the total number of votes cast.
Nv stands for the number of votes allocated to each selector.

The formula weights each selection event according to the number of votes that were allotted. The higher the value of the vote concentration index, the less competition there is – the votes are concentrated on fewer candidates (Goldberg 1994).

2B. Representation

Two representation indices are suggested, similar in their logic to the two non-incumbent winning indices above. Both take women’s representation as an indicator of the representativeness of the candidate list. The first index relates to the proportion of women in safe positions on the party list. That is, it measures the share of women out of the total number of the party’s “real” candidates, not those that appear on the list as a whole. The second measure also relates only to safe positions, but unlike the first one it also takes into account the relative position of women on the list, giving a higher value to higher positions on the party list.

1) The Index of Representation

This index simply calculates the percentage of women in safe positions on the party list by counting the number of women in safe positions divided by the number of safe positions, multiplied by 100. The formula is:

\[ \sum \frac{Wsp}{Sp} \times 100 \]

Wsp is the number of women in positions equal or higher in rank to the number of safe positions.
Sp is the number of safe positions, defined as the number of seats the party won in the previous elections.

2) *The Weighed Index of Representation*

Like the former index, this index counts the number of women in safe positions, but unlike the previous index it takes into consideration the relative position that they won, giving higher values to winning higher positions on the list. That is, each position on the list, up to the position that is equal to the number of safe positions, is given a value in descending order – the last position is given one point and each higher position is “worth” an additional point. The formula is:

\[
\sum \left( \frac{W_p}{V_{pi}} \times Sp \right) \times 100 / \sum Sp
\]

Wp stands for the value of the positions won by women in each selection event.

Vpi stand for the total value of the positions in the specific selection event.

Sp stands for the number of safe positions available in each selection event.

**Participation and Competition**

Table 2 provides a first glance at the relationship between inclusiveness and competition by comparing the results of three kinds of different selectorates, based on the candidate lists submitted to the central election committee. As expected, the nominating committee demonstrates the lowest level of competition expressed in the values of both the non-incumbent winning index (0.181) and the non-incumbent weighted winning index
Our expectations are not fulfilled regarding the comparison between competition in party agencies and in party primaries. The value of the non-incumbent winning index is only slightly higher in the case of party agencies (0.251 compared to 0.242), while the value of the non-incumbent weighted winning index for party primaries is actually higher for party agencies (0.166 compared to 0.148).

**TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**

Because the analysis in Table 2 is based on the candidate lists submitted to the central election committee, it is insensitive to important nuances in the selection methods that could result from the influence of elements that have nothing to do with the nature of the selectorate. For example, correction mechanisms that guarantee a minimal position on the list to a candidate, or candidates, belonging to a distinct sector or social group were used in all cases of party primaries, but only in a few cases of selection by party agencies.* Such mechanisms could bias the results because they sometimes allowed non-incumbents to “win” safe positions based on, for example, their social profile rather than the number of votes they won. Table 3 provides results that are based on “clean” data, which relates to the positions of candidates before the activation of any correction mechanisms. It also adds two indices for the comparison of competition among party members and in selected party agencies.

**TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE**

* Correction mechanisms were not used in nomination committees.
The result of three indices demonstrate that party agencies are more competitive than party primaries: when party agencies are the selectorates more non-incumbents win than in party primaries (Non-Incumbent Winning Index); more new candidates take part in the competition than in party primaries (Aspirant Index); and the votes are more dispersed than in party primaries (Vote Concentration Index).

The Non-Incumbent Weighted Winning Index, however, indicates a slightly higher level of competition in party primaries. This partly reflects the fact that fewer, but more meteoric, successes of non-incumbents were found in the party primaries. But we should take into account that there are more non-incumbent competitors per an incumbent competitor in the case of party agencies. The higher number of non-incumbents actually helps incumbents in their bid for re-selection, because the votes of those who vote “against” incumbents, and those who vote for non-incumbents to “renew” the candidate list, are spread among more competitors. This calls for a different reading of the Non-Incumbent Winning Index – it being higher in the case of party agencies is now even more impressive. Given the higher number of non-incumbent competitors in the case of selection in party agencies, the value of the Non-Incumbent Weighted Winning Index should have been much higher in party primaries than in selection by party agencies, if it is to be used to refute the direction set by the other indices.
Participation and Representation

The data in Table 4 reveals that women are indeed better represented in lists whose composition was determined by nomination committees. But, contrary to expectations, party members produced more representative candidate lists than party agencies. Furthermore, the differences between the lists produced by the three different selectorates are far from being impressive: only 2% in the amount of women in safe positions and less than 3% in the overall representation “cake” according to the weighted index of representation index.

If we take an historical approach, however, the data presented in Table 4 does support the suggestion that the relationship between inclusiveness and representation is negative. That is, regardless of the candidate selection method, we expect that the representation of women should increase over time, as evident from the data on women representation in proportional representation (PR) democracies, among which Israel is counted. As evident in Figure 2, in comparison to the other PR democracies, women representation in Israel’s large parties was relatively high in the 1950s through the 1970s, but relatively low since then. In early times, nomination committees were used in most cases; later, it was party agencies and party primaries. In other words, as the Israeli parties moved toward more inclusive selectorates, their lists of candidates became less representative both objectively

The data is based on the representation of women in only the two major parties in Israel, or their components, for two reasons. First, there are several smaller parties who due to their religious or cultural nature – both Jewish and Muslim/Arab parties – tend not to include any women on their list of candidates. Second, the inclusion of the remaining parties (along with the two main ones but without the religious parties) does not change the outcome.
and even more so comparatively. The largest gap is the 1996 elections, the peak of the inclusiveness era in Israel (Hazan 1997). The two most recent elections (1999 and 2003) show a significant closing of the gap between Israel and the other PR democracies, precisely when the extent of inclusiveness declined.

**FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**

**Conclusions**

The empirical analysis demonstrated that there are uneasy relationships among the three basic democratic dimensions addressed in this paper. High participation results in medium levels of competition and low levels of representation; Low participation results in low levels of competition but high levels of representation. These finding fit nicely with the logic of the cartel party, according to which democratization in one respect, intra-party participation, leads to oligarchic tendencies in other respects, enhancing decision-making power at the top (Katz and Mair 1995; Katz 2001).

Katz (2001: 293) presents the debate over intra-party democracy as a dichotomous one between those that claim that intra-party democracy is an integral part of a democratic polity and those that see no link between intra-party democracy and inter-party (state) democracy. As long as we perceive democracy separately at each level (state and intra-partisan), and thus require universal participation at both, than this debate can continue forever. But, if we instead look at democracy as a multi-dimensional arrangement that relates to several levels of a given political system (including those who are worried
about intra-party democracy), but nevertheless differentiate between them out of the notion that “…there is more to democracy than suffrage…” (Katz 2001:293), then we can arrive at different conclusions. The relationship between democracy within states and democracy between parties is, from this perspective, not a separate issue, nor an identical one, but rather a complementary relationship.

We cannot solve the problem of the uneasy relationship between participation, competition and representation at the state level by choosing the middle path, which would (at least) optimize the balance among the three dimensions, because a democratic state, by its very definition, must enable universal participation. The strength of the participatory imperative at the state level means that we cannot assess democracy within states and democracy within parties in a similar manner. Democracy within states is substantially different from democracy within parties. Therefore, we should not conclude that we must limit participation at the state level in order to achieve higher levels of competition and representation. On the contrary, we claim that because parties are voluntary associations they should not be measured by the same norms as the state’s non-voluntary framework. Because parties do not have to be as inclusive as states, they can enhance democracy along those dimensions that are weak as a result of the state’s requirement for universal inclusiveness.

A state is a non-voluntary, compulsory organization, and as such, in order to be called a democracy, must supply its citizens with the conditions for political participation, for being electors and for being elected. As Katz (1997: 29) puts it, “A democratic ‘nation’
must include everyone.” Parties, however, are voluntary associations. As such, they may set up their own rules, and whomever is unhappy with these rules has the choice of “voice” or “exit” (Hirschman 1970) to another party, to establish a new party, or altogether.

Parties, instead of investing further in participation, may enhance other democratic dimensions – competition and representation. The creation of a relatively balanced list, or the creation of higher levels of competition in order to offset incumbency, may thus require placing limits on the extent and impact of intra-party participatory democracy. It can also be argued that intra-party political participation should also strive for some balance between personal responsiveness, on the one hand, and party cohesion, on the other, in order to achieve what Shugart (2001) called “electoral efficiency” – the translation of the will of a majority of voters into policies.

Furthermore, parties, as voluntary association, have not only the right (which the state lacks) but also the imperative to sustain themselves as voluntary participatory arenas. In order to do so, they must have the ability to use differential incentives in order to encourage higher, more sincere, levels of activism beyond the candidate selection event itself. Enhanced, and equivalent, political participation in candidate selection damages the differential structure of rewards in parties when the privileges of long-time loyal activists are equaled to those of new, temporary and unfaithful registrants. Enhancing the quantity of participation by reducing its qualitative element to the lowest common denominator is not necessarily the correct approach (Rahat and Hazan, forthcoming).
What do these findings tell us about the link between parties and democracy? They tell us that the quality of democracy requires a division of labor between the state and the political parties. The state should be the one that takes care of participation, while parties should enhance competition and representation. Otherwise, we end up with a very inclusive polity, but with very little competition and representation. In other words, because political parties – like other important enclaves in modern democracies (courts are the most prominent examples) – are not subject to the universal participatory prerequisite, they may be used to fine-tune other aspects of the democratic polity. We thus suggest a more optimist view than that of Lipset (1968) and the “elitist” theory. That is, we do not merely argue that democracy is about competition between “oligarchic” organizations, but that these organizations – as long as they are acting in the framework of a democratic state that abides by the participatory prerequisite – can contribute to enhancing democracy on other, not insignificant dimensions, which require compensation due to the price extracted at the state level by the prerequisite for universal participation.

The logic of investing the parties’ efforts in enhancing representation and competition – rather than participation – is even more evident when relating to the contribution of the organizations of civil society to democracy. These voluntary associations supply an arena for various forms of political participation. That is, the state supplies some minimal yet universal opportunities for participation, while civil society is where the more interested and motivated may find expression in deeper forms of participation. Unlike parties, by definition, the organizations of civil society do not compete for public posts, and thus
cannot provide for competition nor can they correctly claim that they represent the population.

Ware (2002) suggested that the relative weakness of American parties resulted from expectations that were too high. That is, because parties were expected to adhere to the participatory ideal they lost their importance as intermediaries between state and society. Our study suggests that putting all the eggs in the participatory basket was problematic from a wider democratic perspective. That is, the price of wider participation is paid in the US in terms of relatively low levels of competition and representation. As Katz (1997) claims, it is likely that democratization in certain respects will lead to less democracy on others. Thus, “The problem is to determine the most desirable of the feasible combination of values” (Katz 1997:6). We suggest that before turning to the normative realm, to defining the most desirable combination of value, it is important to clarify the uneasy relationship among those values, theoretically and empirically.
TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE 1:
The Uneasy Relationship Within Parties Between Participation, Representation and Competitiveness: Three Kinds of Selectorates Based on Inclusiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOCRATIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination Committee</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Agency</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Primaries</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCLUSIVENESS OF THE SELECTORATE

TABLE 2:
Competition in Three Kinds of Selectorates:
An Analysis of Candidate Lists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selectorate</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Number of Incumbents</th>
<th>Non-Incumbents Winning Safe Positions</th>
<th>Non-Incumbent Winning Index</th>
<th>Non-Incumbent Weighted Winning Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominating Committee</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Party Agency</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Members</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated on the basis of data from Rashumot (Israeli government official records)
TABLE 3:

Competition in Two Kinds of Selectorates:
An Analysis of Results of Intra-Party Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selectorate</th>
<th>Non-Incumbent Winning Index*</th>
<th>Non-Incumbent Weighted Winning Index*</th>
<th>Aspirant Index**</th>
<th>Vote Concentration Index***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selected Party Agency</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>4.291</td>
<td>0.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Members</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>2.737</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In cases where parties conducted separate contests for specific positions on the candidate list, each selection event was separately calculated.


TABLE 4:
Representation of Women in Knesset Candidate Lists
According to Three Kinds of Selectorates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selectorate</th>
<th>Women in Safe Positions</th>
<th>Weighted Index of Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominating Committee</td>
<td>10.5% (64/612)</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Party Agency</td>
<td>8.5% (27/316)</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Members</td>
<td>9.3% (16/172)</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


FIGURE 1:
Inclusiveness and Exclusiveness of Selectorates

Source: updated from Rahat and Hazan (2001).
FIGURE 2:
Women’s Representation in Israel and in PR Democracies, 1950-2003

Source: PR democracies from Matland 1998.
Appendix: Examples of the Indices*

Non-Incumbent Winning Index

The formula is:

\[ \frac{\sum Wni}{\sum Ci} \]

Wni is the number of winning non-incumbents who won a position on the list that is equal or higher in rank to the number of competing incumbents in each selection event. Ci is the number of competing incumbents in each selection event.

For example: 5 MPs compete for positions on the list of candidates for the next parliament. They win the first, second, third, fifth and seventh positions on the party’s list. This means that a single non-incumbent (who is in the fourth position on the list) “won”. The Non-Incumbents Winning Index is, therefore, \( \frac{1}{5} = 0.2 \).

Non-Incumbent Weighted Winning Index

The formula is:

\[ \frac{\sum \left( \frac{Vpni}{Vpi} \right) \times Ci}{\sum Ci} \]

Vpni stand for the value of the positions won by non-incumbents in each selection event. Vpi stand for the total value of the positions in the specific selection event.

* The examples given are per case; if there is more then a single case, than the results need to be summed, as shown in the formulae.
The value of the victory in each selection event (Vpni/Vpi) is then multiplied by the number of competing incumbents in each selection event (Ci), and then divided by the sum of the number of competing incumbents in all selection events.

For example: 5 MPs compete for positions on the list of candidates for the next parliament. They win the first, second, third, fifth and seventh positions on the party’s list. The total weighted value of the list is: 5 (for the 1\textsuperscript{st} position) + 4 (for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} position) + 3 (for the 3\textsuperscript{rd} position) + 2 (for the 4\textsuperscript{th} position) + 1 (for the 5\textsuperscript{th} position) = 15. The single winning non-incumbent is in position number 4 on the list with a value of 2. The Non-Incumbents Weighted Winning Index is, therefore, \( \frac{2}{15} = 0.133 \).

**Aspirant Index**

The formula is:

\[
\frac{\sum C_{ni}}{\sum C_i}
\]

C\textsubscript{ni} stands for the number of competing non-incumbents who contended for safe positions.

C\textsubscript{i} stands for the number of competing incumbents who contended for safe positions on the party list.

For example: In Party A, 5 MPs and 10 non-incumbents compete for safe positions on the list of candidates for the next parliament. In Party B, 10 MPs and 50 non-incumbents compete for safe positions on the list of candidates for the next parliament. The Aspirant Index for Party A is \( \frac{10}{5} = 2 \). The Aspirant Index for Party B is \( \frac{50}{10} = 5 \). Party B is, therefore, more competitive in this respect.
Vote Concentration Index

The formula is:

$$\sum \left[ \frac{V_{nv}}{V_t} \times N_v \right]$$

$$\sum N_v$$

$V_{nv}$ stands for the number of votes won by the candidates in the top positions on the party list that is equal to the number of votes allocated to each selector in each selection event.

$V_t$ stands for the total number of votes cast.

$N_v$ stands for the number of votes allocated to each selector.

For example: 25 candidates compete for safe positions on the list of candidates for the next parliament. Each of the 100 members of the selectorate has 9 votes. The sum of all the votes is $9 \times 100 = 900$. The sum of the votes that the first nine candidates win is 600.

The Vote Concentration Index is, therefore, $\frac{600}{900} = 0.667$.

The Index of Representation

The formula is:

$$\sum \frac{W_{sp}}{Sp} \times 100$$

$W_{sp}$ is the number of women in positions equal or higher in rank to the number of safe positions.

$Sp$ is the number of safe positions, defined as the number of seats the party won in the previous elections.
For example: Party A won 5 seats in the previous elections. Women appear in the third and fifth positions on Party A’s list of candidate for the next parliament.

The Index of Representation is, therefore, \( \frac{2}{5} \times 100 = 40\% \).

*The Weighted Index of Representation*

The formula is:

\[
\frac{\sum \left( \frac{W_p}{V_{pi}} \times Sp \right)}{\sum Sp} \times 100
\]

Wp stands for the value of the positions won by women in each selection event.

Vpi stand for the total value of the positions in the specific selection event.

Sp stands for the number of safe positions available in each selection event.

For example: Party A won 5 seats in the previous elections. Women appear in the third and fifth positions on Party A’s list of candidate for the next parliament. The total weighted value of the list is: 5 (for the 1st position) + 4 (for the 2nd position) + 3 (for the 3rd position) + 2 (for the 4th position) + 1 (for the 5th position) = 15.

Women won positions 3 on the list (with a value of 3) and 5 (with a value of 1). The sum of these values is 3+1 = 4. The Weighted Index of Representation is, therefore, \( \frac{4}{15} \times 100 = 26.7\% \).
References


