ABSTRACT

Recent studies point at foreign support directed to rebel groups as a factor triggering civilian victimization. The reasoning: rebels think strategically and calculate that more external funding means less need for a strong relationship with local civilians for the sake of resources. This paper claims that different kinds of foreign support lead to different rates in civilian victimization. However, the study’s zero-inflated negative binomial regression model finds little evidence for the theoretical argument that the link between foreign support and civilian victimization is caused by a change in rebel’s dependence on civilians. Nonetheless, the regression model does identify a strong positive correlation between on the one hand foreign support through the provision of I) troops, II) access to military or intelligence infrastructure & joint operations and III) intelligence material & other forms of support and on the other hand civilian victimization. The paper moreover argues that secessionism functions as an interaction effect within the relationship between foreign support and civilian victimization. Receiving foreign support means for secessionist an international recognition of their objectives. This paper argues that because of that recognition, secessionists’ concern about their international reputation diminishes and that they are consequently less restrained in perpetrating civilian victimization. The data analysis confirms that secessionist rebels tend to be engaged in higher rates of civilian victimization when they receive foreign support.

Keywords

INTRA STATE ARMED CONFLICT – ONE-SIDED VIOLENCE – FOREIGN SUPPORT — CIVILIAN VICTIMIZATION – SECESSIONISM
SECTION 1- INTRODUCTION

Foreign support to warring parties still remains a crucial part of today’s international politics discourse. This can be illustrated with two recent outstanding examples. The Kurds in Northern Iraq have been supported since June 2014 by, among others, airstrikes of the United States (US)-led coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). “Near-constant international air cover gives the peshmerga great reassurance, particularly at night, and smashes many ISIL attacks before they have even unfolded fully” (Al Jazeera, 2015). The Kurds also receive support via training activities and weapons and equipment provision by the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and the Netherlands. Foreign support is also of high relevance in the armed intra-state conflict that is at the same time taking place in Eastern Ukraine. The pro-Russian separatists in this conflict are likely to receive direct and/or indirect foreign support from Russia. On January 25th 2015, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated: "I strongly urge Russia to stop its military, political and financial support for the separatists, stop destabilizing Ukraine and respect its international commitments," (Reuters, 2015).

Whatever may be a rebel group’s cause or grievance: foreign support is crucial for the sake of their capacity to pursue their goals.¹ Both examples show the relevance and crucial role of foreign support in major wars influencing the dynamics of the conflict and global power politics overall. However, besides strengthening the rebel’s capabilities, foreign support has many unintended side effects. This paper touches upon a crucial downside of foreign support on the local scale: the increasing probability of civilian victimization. Foreign support increased for example the amount of civilians being victimized by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda. The ADF attacked civilians as a means to show their commitment to their sponsors, the governments of Congo and Sudan (Hovil & Werker, 2005). There are generally a lot of militant groups that are sponsored externally and from which their external sponsor accepts - and sometimes even supports – civilian victimization, inter alia in the case of Hezbollah supported by Iraq and Syria or RENAMO supported South Africa and Rhodesia. Firstly, because foreign support replaces the resources a rebel group generally gains through

¹ This can be foreign support by any kind of actor: a ‘state government, a diaspora, a non-state rebel group, an organization such as an NGO or IGO, a political party, a company or a lobby group, or even an individual’ (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011a:6).
its strong ties with a local population. When the need for a local relationship decreases and the strong ties with local civilians therefore diminish or never get established, rebel fighters will be less restrained in victimizing civilians. Secondly, foreign supported rebel groups are likely to attract more opportunistic fighters, who are less committed to the rebels cause and less restrained in victimizing civilians. This study focuses on the first explanation for civilian victimization by looking at the manners of foreign intervention and their effect on a rebel group’s resource accessibility.

Civilian victimization is a phenomenon we see on a daily base in all kinds of conflicts. For example by the non-state actor Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), who uses extreme violence against both civilians and captured combatants (United Nations, 2014). In the past years violence against civilians has mostly taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to data by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Eck & Hultman, 2007). A large literature canon focuses on the motivations for civilian victimization and on foreign support. However, the link between both is under-researched. It is of high societal relevance to understand the influence of different kinds of foreign support on the behavior of rebels towards civilians. Moreover, the existing literature does not take into consideration what this relationship looks like in the different war contexts. It is striking that the latter has not been researched so far, as secessionist wars nowadays increase to occur consisting of very specific conflict dynamics (Griffiths, 2015). This paper touches upon the influence of the different types of foreign support and on what this looks like in case of a secessionist conflict.

The research gap

Previous civil armed conflict research has suggested that foreign support may increase the likelihood of civilian victimization by the rebel group that is being supported during a particular civil war (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014; Hovil and Werker 2005; Weinstein 2007). Civilian victimization is considered to be the direct and deliberate killing of civilians and is in some instances called: ‘one-sided violence in intrastate-armed conflicts’ (Eck & Hultman, 2007). For the sake of coherence, this paper calls it ‘civilian victimization’.

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2 Within the literature several names appear covering civilian victimization, such as civilian targeting, violence against civilians, one-sided violence, barbarism, terrorism, mass-killing, genocide, and so on. Before being able to study civilian victimization, it is crucial to state a definition of the phenomenon. This study uses the definition by the UCDP of ‘one-sided violence’ to define civilian victimization: ‘The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year’ (Eck, Sollenberg & Wallensteen, 2004:136).
Civilian victimization can generally be considered to be a phenomenon that is a strategic tactic and rational tool when it assists actors, like rebel groups, in fighting for their cause. The strategy can be considered useful for rebels in order to 1) improve their bargaining position over that of their opponents, 2) to speed up the war towards a closure and/or 3) to collect resources to be used for the rebels’ war operations. Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) show two strong reasons for increasing civilian victimization due to foreign support. Firstly, by pointing at a rebel’s diminishing need of resources from civilians. Consequently, the rebels are also less in need of a strong relationship with the civilians, which increases the probability that they victimize them. Secondly by pointing at the fact that rebel groups receiving foreign support tend to attract more opportunistic recruits that are less committed to the group’s cause. The accessibility of resources is the key factor explaining the influence of foreign support on civilian victimization in this study.

However, one can assume that rebel behavior towards civilians is not similar for every type of war. A secessionist war consists of completely different conflict dynamics then for example a war aiming at a coup d’état. A starting point for this claim is the work by Fazal (2013). She argues that secessionists are less likely to target civilians when engaged in civil war than non-secessionists. Firstly, because secessionists care about their reputation and they want to be seen as “good citizens” internationally. This reputation is important for their potential future independence. Fazal’s (2013) study suggests that rebels fighting a secessionist conflicts have incentives to avoid terrorism. In order to gain actual independence, a rebel group needs to have more then just physical control over territory. Gaining independence also requires that the international community recognizes the respective territory potentially belonging to the respective rebel group. All in all, this means that rebel groups that look for independence should be concerned about their international legitimacy. A crucial way for rebels to increase the legitimacy of their territorial claim and of their identity is to comply with international (humanitarian) law in all their actions, including the laws against targeting civilians (ICRC.org, 2015). Secondly, it is not likely that they will attack civilians that will potentially make up their future inhabitants. Nonetheless, 1) Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) and 2) Fazal (2013) who both aim at explaining the occurrence of civilian victimization show shortcomings, which are addressed in this study.

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3 Secessionists are different from rebels seeking autonomy. The first wants to have an independent state, the latter merely more governance possibilities, often in a particular area. The operationalization in the research design touches upon this.
The data used in the analysis of Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) merely looks at the presence and origin of foreign support. Their study does not focus on the extent of support or the degree of dependency on foreign supporters. As such, their analysis treats groups that are wholly financed by a foreign sponsor and those that are less dependent on external funding as equal. This paper takes a closer look into how foreign supporters shape conflict dynamics by focusing on the kinds of foreign support in order to get a better insight in the relationship with civilian victimization. It focuses on the different manners of external intervention in civil wars and especially on how and why those manners shape rebel behavior. It looks at the effect of the following types of foreign support on rebel behavior: 1) troops as secondary warring party, 2) access to territory, 3) access to military or intelligence infrastructure, 4) weapons, 5) materiel/logistics, 6) training/expertise, 7) funding/economic support and 8) intelligence material. Furthermore it makes a distinction between 1) critical forms of support, 2) valuable forms of support and 3) minor forms of support. The paper separately explains how those three support categories potentially influence the rebels’ relationship with a civil population.

The data analysis that follows, using a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Model, shows which form of support encourages civilian victimization and which does so less or not at all.

Secondly, the paper takes a closer look at rebels’ war aims and researches the influence of foreign support for secessionist rebels on their behavior towards civilians. The paper challenges the claim that secessionists generally victimize fewer civilians than non-secessionists, as stated by several scholars (Fazal, 2013). In the case that secessionists win a war, it will generally be more difficult for them to gain international recognition than for non-secessionists winning a civil war. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show, this is because of the fact that non-violence for them is less effective than it is for non-secessionists. Based on this reasoning, one could argue that secessionist victimization of civilians is actually more likely. Historically there have also been cases of civilian victimization by a government instead of a rebel group in a region claimed by secessionists. This ‘government targeting’ can be an important factor in the reason for secessionist civilian victimization, used as a counter-attack. Government targeting of civilians is however not covered by this research in greater detail. Also running counter to Fazal (2013) is Stanton (2013) who argues that rebel groups with so-called ‘exclusionary aims’ (such as secessionists) are more likely to engage in high-casualty strategies of terrorism compared to rebel groups with ‘inclusive aims’, such as revolutionaries. Inclusive groups would then kill the civilians by whom they are supported,
while for the exclusive groups there is not always such a risk when killing civilians. The reasoning that applies here is that civilian targeting happens out of a certain idea of reciprocity. This paper continues this reasoning by arguing that secessionist rebel groups who are receiving foreign support will be more inclined to attack civilians. Previous research, however, claims that secessionists are generally in need of a good international status. When secessionists receive external support, it could mean they are receiving strong recognition from an important allied actor. This could make the rebels less concerned about their international position and more inclined to victimize civilians. This reasoning is based on short-term calculation by rebels, aiming at winning a war by securing territory. This short-term calculation can also be found in the grounds for victimizing civilians.

In short, this paper is a statistical exercise of measuring how different kinds of foreign support to rebel groups influence the behavior of these groups towards local civilians and what role different war aims play within this relationship of variables. It provides new insights into the phenomenon of civilian victimization in intra-state armed conflict by looking at which kind of foreign support changes their behavior towards civilians.

The paper’s main research question is:

**Does the type of foreign support to rebels affect civilian victimization?**

This question can be drawn in the following causal diagram representing the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable:

Figure 1.1. Paper’s conceptual model

In the process of answering the research question, the paper aims at answering the following theoretical sub-questions:
A) What are the rebels’ motivations for civilian victimization?
B) What resources does a rebel group need and subsequently which foreign support is the most important?
C) Why will secessionist rebels receiving foreign support be less restrained to victimize civilians than secessionist rebels that are not receiving foreign support?

Empirically, this paper will research the following sub-questions:

D) What is the effect of ‘critical forms of foreign support’ on civilian victimization?
E) What is the effect of ‘valuable forms of foreign support’ on civilian victimization?
F) What is the effect of ‘minor forms of foreign support’ on civilian victimization?
G) What is the effect of foreign support to rebels with secessionist war aims on civilian victimization?
H) What is the effect of different manners of foreign to rebels with secessionist war aims on civilian victimization?

Sub question H, presenting an interaction effect of the main research question, can be drawn into the following causal diagram:

Figure 1.2 Conceptual model of the interaction effect
Research design

This paper conducts a quantitative large-n study using a Zero-Inflated-Negative-Binomial (ZINB) regression model. The dataset the study analyses is a merged dataset based on data from the UCDP Dyad Dataset, the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, the UCDP Foreign Support Dataset, the Secessionist Movements version 3 Dataset by Ryan Glidditsh (2005), and the Expanded GDP and Trade Dataset by Gleditsch (2002). All of these together are merged into one base dataset that includes details on all intrastate conflicts from 1989 till 2009, where at least one the sides was a government and the other side a rebel group. The dataset produced includes in total 1075 intra state armed conflicts.

SECTION 2 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The rational motivation behind civilian victimization

In the 70’s, Hanna Arendt stated that violence is only a rational tool to the extent that it can assist certain actors in attaining their goals (Arendt, 1970). Viewing violence as a strategic tool has received growing attention lately within the civilian victimization literature (i.e. by Hultman, 2007; Downes, 2006). Valentino, et al (2006:340) even described civilian victimization as ‘war by other means’, arguing that the phenomenon is a deliberately chosen act contributing to the perpetrator’s war aims. Stanton (2013) explained terrorism in a similar way, by stating that: ‘Rebel groups make strategic calculations, assessing how their government opponents and their own civilian constituencies will react to terrorism.’

Historically, the rationalist framework has been proven to be a fruitful tool in international relations and peace and conflict literature for understanding the causes of war, the termination of war and the process of general conflict management (Lake, 2002). Scholars applied the approach to all kinds of civil wars, interstate wars and ethnic wars. Like Fearon (1995), who famously claimed that war happens due to a rational calculation when one or both of the parties: 1) have certain information that is private and that can be misrepresented, 2) are not...

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4 The paper applies the UCDP definition of armed conflict: ‘An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’ (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2001).

5 Before being able to study civilian victimization, it is important to state a definition of the phenomenon. The UCDP established in 2002 the word ‘one-sided violence’, which they defined as: “The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year’” (Eck, Sollenberg & Wallensteen, 2004:136).
able to agree with how a certain issue has been divided, 3) see(s) the problem as inseparable. Within the peace and conflict literature on civilian victimization, the rationalist (also called instrumentalist) approach gained a prominent role.

Within the specific peace and conflict literature that aims at explaining the occurrence of civilian victimization, one can distinguish two influential approaches. The first, among others supported by Weinstein (2007), focuses on rebel group’s need for resources as a factor explaining civilian victimization. When rebels rely for resources on external actors and/or contraband, they will I) struggle more in controlling their troops and II) have worse relationships with the civilians and for that reason they are more unrestrained to attack and kill civilians. Weinstein (2007) moreover underlines the lack of organizational discipline within a rebel group as an important factor explaining civilian victimization. The second theoretical approach on civilian victimization focuses on the control over territory during a conflict, as described by Kalyvas (2006). Kalyvas (2006) looks at the micro-level dynamics of conflicts and argues that the intensity and the sort of killing by rebels, discriminate or indiscriminate, is generally depended on their amount of territorial control. Possessing more territorial control decreases civilian victimization. Territory makes the rebels able to transfer resources to places that experience heavy fighting losses. By filling up the resource gap, the demand from rebels on civilians for resources decreases. Besides that, controlling territory means that a rebel group is able to provide certain services to civilians, like security or land ownership. Those rebels should be relatively better in creating a strong relationship with civilians.

Several scholars stated that actors will start victimizing civilians as a rational means to I) improve their bargaining position over the position of their enemy and II) to quicken the ending of an armed conflict (i.e. Downes, 2006;). Moreover, several scholars also claim that the aim for attacking civilians is to adjust the behavior of the group being targeted to the rebel’s preference (Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2010). Balcells (2011) argues that civilian victimization can also take place for the sake of getting rid of populations that are being perceived as threatening to the rebel organization or not following its cause.

Some scholars argue that when a rebel group experiences heavy fighting costs through armed conflict, it can become less eager to start rebel violence and subsequently less eager to target civilians (Wood, 2014). Losses can significantly weaken the rebel group’s capacity and
decrease the size of the area in which the group is operating. Consequently when rebels are losing human capacity due to war losses, they can feel encouraged to treat civilians more decently in order to gain new recruits and resources. However, this is not a set rule as high costs and high losses may also encourage rebels to perpetrate civilian victimization, due to the fact that they suddenly might need a relatively high amount of resources (Wood, 2014:996):

In sum, civilian victimization has been linked to many different explaining factors. Among others using it as a means of control, power distribution, to create a certain threat perception, for the sake of resources, and for acquiring territory. This paper zooms in on one explaining variable: the change in resource accessibility due to foreign support, which lies in line with Weinstein’s (2007:13) argumentation.

**Why foreign support leads to civilian victimization**

Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) provide the first cross-national large-N study on the influence of foreign support on civilian victimization. One of the main factors fueling the mechanism behind the relationship between these two concepts is access to resources. Several studies show that, independent of a rebel group’s goals, aims, grievances or motivations, the group needs to gain financial resources in the end in order to fund its activities & objectives and to survive (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Without resources, the group will not be able to sustain its activities. Therefore, the behavior of a rebel groups often strongly depends on the access to resources, as they will have to adjust their activities to it. This adjustment starts by the resource-richness of the environment a rebel group operates in (Weinstein, 2007). Even though in many conflicts diamonds and lootable resources are crucial sources of income for rebels, there are lots of cases where rebel groups got established in environments that lack a proper amount of accessible resources, for example in Rwanda or Ethiopia (Weinstein, 2005). Within those cases the rebel leaders needed to look for other ways of funding. They did this for example by trying to gain ‘ethnic solidary’, focusing on national sentiments or intensifying relationships with local populations through which they found the needed recruits and resources in order to sustain their violent campaign (Weinstein, 2005). In the Ethiopian case, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) provided support to the civilians through security and local governance in their controlled area in return: “The establishment mass associations and local administrations in the liberated territories was a critical element in the TPLF’s peasant mobilization” (Young, 2006:189).
An advantage of a strong relationship with civilians is for the rebels the attraction of committed recruits:

“In resource-poor environments, leaders attract new recruits by drawing on social ties to make credible promises about the private rewards that will come with victory. Opportunistic joiners stay away from these movements, leaving a pool of activists recruits willing to invest their time and energy in the hope of reaping large gains in the future.” (Weinstein, 2005:599).

Generally, trust building with the population can provide rebels with resources in terms of goods like shelter, material and funding and with moral support towards their objectives (Weinstein, 2005). In the end, this means that rebels who possess more resources are less in need of the support of the civilian population for their survival and their objectives and will be less reluctant to victimize civilians in case that benefits their position. On the other hand, rebels that possess less resources: “may still at times target civilians, we expect that the level of such abuse is likely to be relatively low compared to groups with alternative sources of funding” (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014:9). Rebel groups that focus on a strong relationship with the local and civilian population will have a greater interest in avoiding violent behavior towards the civilians, have an interest in recruiting soldiers that are capable and committed and they will actually punish the ones that kill or abuse civilians. “Some military organizations work to suppress bad behavior, instill discipline, and punish transgressions; however, others are either indifferent to abuse or incapable of constraining it” (Salehyan, Siroky, Wood, 2014:10). Though, important to note is that this mechanism does not always work that way. Wood (2010) claims that stronger rebels in terms of resources are better in creating security for civilians, which will benefit new recruits and create a certain loyalty among civilians towards the rebel group.

Even though resources gained within the territory claimed by the rebel group are important, foreign actor support is generally speaking the most used way of funding for rebels. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) show that a majority of the rebel movements that are operating since 1945 have received direct foreign support or supposed to have foreign connections. A large range of studies have shown that rebel organizations receive funds, arms, and external territory from foreign states (i.e. Regan, 2002; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). When comparing civil wars over a longer time period, one can detect that
it is an increasingly used funding tool for rebels (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014). One of
the reasons for this is the fact that wars are nowadays not any longer solely focused on
domestic or regional dynamics, but are strongly influenced by politics and foreign
intervention (Kaldor, 2009). Moreover, as Kaldor (2009) outlines, globalization plays an
important role in i.e. making it easier for diaspora to financial support warring parties abroad.

Foreign support to conflicting parties has been influenced by shifts in global power politics.
During the cold war, external funding was in relatively many instances provided by either
Russia or the Western World, predominantly the United States. Rebel groups with a Marxist
oriented approach or conversely a more Western approach in their behavior would receive
funding from one of the opposing sides in the cold war. However, the end of the cold war
caused a significant global change in foreign support for warring parties, as a large amount of
rebel groups started to receive less sponsorship (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). This made some
of those groups look for other ways to obtain funding, for example illegal trade in drugs, in
order to sustain their (violent) campaigns (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Kaldor, 2009).

But why then does access foreign support lead to increased prevalence of civilian
victimization? Most importantly for this paper’ causal mechanism is that: “Access to foreign
patrons reduces the rebel’s need to “win the hearts and minds” of the civilian population and
raises the probability of civilian abuse” (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014:6). Resources
provided by a foreign actor strengthen a rebel group most in terms of survival, general
fighting capacity and being able to achieve its goals. Those goals could be to gain autonomy
over a certain territory claimed by the rebels or to have more power within a country’s
government. Consequently the rebel group becomes less dependent on civilian support.
Besides that, the task of persuading the local populations about the rebels cause and
establishing and maintaining a strong connection with these locals is costly in terms of time
and resources. When rebels receive external financial support, they can use that time for other
activities related to their cause.

A second reason for an increase in civilian victimization is that “those groups with access to
resources provided by foreign sponsors are more likely to attract opportunistic thugs who are
inclined to prey on civilians” (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014:11). Having direct access to
resources can cause a rapid enlargement of the rebel group which can challenge the leadership
of the group to remain able properly to oversee the new recruits in regard to their capacities
and this can lead to a moment where the more self-interested recruits gain more space and play a more dominant role than the one’s who are fighting for the group’s overall cause (Weinstein, 2007).

A third, less directly visible reason for the presence of foreign state funding to be linked to the presence of civilian victimization is that “in some cases rebels target civilians in an effort to demonstrate their commitment to the sponsor and maintain their resource flows” (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014:13). In those cases civilian victimization can serve as a sign that they are at least ‘doing something’ even though that is not directly what the sponsor expects. There are however cases in which targeting civilians is an explicit demand by the sponsor. Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) underline that if foreign support leads to the motivation to victimize civilians as a form of showing commitment, then this support should be of larger size than that which rebels can gain through looting from civilians. There is not always some sort of long-term perspective in targeting civilians. Some groups or individuals merely have very short-term goals in mind, when there is the opportunity to do so. Studies by Leiby (2009) or Weinstein (2007) underline the options and incentives for persons to take part in sexual exploitation as well as victimizing civilians out of grievance or revenge.

To conclude this section, in conducting this study it is important to determine what can be seen as foreign support. The definition of the concept of external support which this paper uses is based on the definition used by the UCDP to define foreign support to warring parties. The UCDP distinguishes between two kinds of external support 1) secondary warring support and 2) secondary non-warring support. The first one is merely one type of support, while the second one consists of ten different kinds of support. In total this paper detects eleven kinds

6 It is important to keep in mind that foreign support is not just providing a set of resources without anything in return. The sponsoring state does expect to receive a return for its provided support, which they partly do by aiming at influencing the behavior of the sponsored group (Salehyan, Siroky & Wood, 2014). It is generally very lucrative for states to provide foreign support as attacking rival parties (states or non-state actors) directly themselves is of course militarily costly. Attacking rival parties also causes a loss of popular support due to being directly involved in unpopular wars and losing votes. Outsourcing the fighting to rebel groups can instead save the face of the political leader, as only the third group is now directly involved in challenging the state’s enemy. However, these government do still expect to be able to control the rebel behavior by, for example, influencing their war strategies and aims. Salehyan, Siroky & Wood (2014) cite the rebel group Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) in Mozambique as an example of a rebel group largely created by the support of foreign actors (Rhodesia and South Africa). Moreover, RENAMO is known for its high scale civilian victimization.
of support, both under 1) and 2), which can be explained as following:

1) Secondary warring support
   The paper uses UCDP’s definition, which states: “(...) support to a primary party (receiver of support) that consists of sending troops to assist in an ongoing conflict. The party sending troops is always a state who shares the position in the incompatibility with one of the primary parties. A secondary warring party does not need to meet the 25 battle-related deaths criteria (...). An active troop participation of their forces is enough.” (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011:5)

2) Secondary non-warring support
   The paper uses UCDP’s definition, which states: “(...) support to a primary party (receiver of support) that is given to assist it in an ongoing conflict. The non-warring support can take a variety of forms, including the provision of sanctuary, financial assistance, logistics and military support short of troops. The party providing the support should be a state or an organization (in the widest sense of the term) and not an individual” (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011:5-6).

The actual external supporter that provides the warring or non-warring support is considered to be any kind of actor or party. This group can be a state government, a diaspora, a non-state rebel group, a political party, a company, a lobby group, an individual or any kind of institutionalized organization (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011:6).

**Different forms of external support**
What kind of resources do rebel groups need to be able to sustain their activities? Insurgent groups have a broad set of needs in order to be able to fight for their cause, which in the end can be divided in 1) material and 2) human needs (Byman, et al. 2001:83). Fighting requires a large amount of material resources, which consist in particular of logistical material, food, weapons and transportation. Besides material expenses, the expenditures of rebels focus on paying bribes to locals, compensating their militants and creating and proliferating their propaganda (Byman, et al. 2001).

Byman et al. (2001:84) created an overview of the resources of which rebels are in need to execute their campaign, divided between human and material:
Table 2.1 The resources that rebels need

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human</th>
<th>Material</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to mobilize local and international support</td>
<td>Safe haven and transit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capable leadership, including effective command and control</td>
<td>Financial resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Direct military support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence concerning the adversary</td>
<td>Arms and material, including ammunition, food and fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspiration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational aid</td>
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In order to understand the influence of the different kinds of foreign support, this paper follows Byman et al. (2001) in their distinction between the different kinds of foreign support and their influence on the capabilities of rebels and makes explicit use of Byman, et al.’s typology concerning the kinds of support. Byman et al. (2001) created a distinction between 1) critical forms of support, 2) valuable forms of support and 3) minor forms of support. Subsequently, this paper links all three of these to the degree in which they influence the rebels’ resource accessibility and by that their influence on a rebel groups need for civilian support.

**Critical forms of foreign support**

The first category of foreign support to rebel groups, as also indicated by Bryman, et al (2001), is called ‘critical forms of support’.

**Territorial support**

A critical form of support is first of all the provision of territory. For example by providing safe havens and transit possibilities on a foreign country’s soil. These ‘safe’ territories can protect the leadership and the members of the respective rebel group that is supported. These areas - or enclaves - make it possible for groups to regroup, to rest and to create a strategy for future campaigns (Byman, et al. 2001:84). Moreover, the provided area can be used for training of the rebel’s members, for recruitment of new militants and as a place to spread propaganda concerning the rebel’s cause and aims. If rebel groups were not to have such an area, it would mean they were instantly vulnerable towards their opposing party, often a government, effectively in an ‘open field’ (Byman, et al. 2001). Often it is the case that these safe territories are being provided by countries neighboring the rebels and thus sharing a
border with them. The fact that the members of the rebel movement can travel from one country to another without any hassle or danger makes it more difficult for the enemy to attack them effectively. For the foreign supporter on the other hand, it is relatively cheap to provide this kind of support and means they are not involved themselves in the actual task of fighting (Byman, et al. 2001). The latter can be a positive motivation for countries where providing foreign support is seen politically or publically as a controversial issue.

When a foreign government provides this form of support, it clearly increases the rebel’s resource accessibility. It creates new safe havens and shelter, which could otherwise have been provided by civilians. Civilians, whilst not being part of the conflict, can provide passage and safe areas for the rebels. When civilians allow rebels to live among them, this can provide in same protection for rebels against government attacks, as government are often reluctant in targeting civilian areas. Based on the assumption that an increase in resource accessibility correlates with a worsening relationship between rebels and civilians, and consequently one can assume that the provision of territory leads to a higher probability of civilian victimization. This seems to run counter to claims made by Kalyvas (2006) who argues that more territory for rebels means a better relationship with civilians, as rebels are able to provide security, land ownership and can transport their own resources more easily. However, that is in the case that rebels actually own a larger piece of land from which they operate. The provision of support is in most cases on foreign soil, provided temporarily (Byman, et al. 2001).

Financial support

A second critical form of support is financial support: “given that most insurgencies take place in impoverished areas, guerilla movements often are forced to look abroad for funds they need to support their armed struggle” (Byman et al. 2001: 87). It has been shown by previous research that, whatever other forms of income a group receives, economic endowments are most crucial for a successful campaign (Collier, et al., 2003). An essential difference from safe havens is that this can be provided through varied and dispersed sources or individuals not situated in one of the neighboring states. As has been underlined already, financial means are one of the most crucial forms of resources for rebels, besides human capacity. In the case of no financial support being available from abroad, rebels are largely depended on the local civilian population for food and shelter, or local natural resources, like diamonds. Supporting rebels financially takes away parts of the direct need of civilian support
as rebels will be better at financing for example their own materials, compensating their members and they can also spend more time on their campaign than on keeping up good relations with civilians. This can cause an increase in the probability that rebels victimize local civilians.

Direct military support
A fourth form of critical support is direct military support. Even though this type of support does not occur on such a regular basis. When it does occur, however, it has a potentially strong impact on the dynamics of a conflict. The major critical change due to this kind of support is that the nature of the conflict changes and is no longer simply a fight between a group of militants and a government. The war in this case starts to take on characteristics of an interstate conflict. One can expect that the more weapons a rebel group receives, the less it will be depended on the civilian population. A rebel group will be able to act more independent, experiencing a successful campaign, which generates income. In turn that can increase the probability of civilian victimization, as rebels do no longer need the civilians.

A fourth form of foreign support being described by Bymen et al., 2001 is political support and propaganda. However, the provision of political support and propaganda will not directly affect the resource accessibility of rebels and does not directly diminish the need of support by local civilians. As resource accessibility is the main explaining mechanism in this study, this form of support will not be further discussed.

Valuable forms of foreign support
The second category of foreign support to rebel groups, as also indicated by Bryman, et al (2001), is called ‘valuable forms of support’.

Provision of training
The provision of training can in some cases be highly valuable, as rebels are not always capable of providing good and powerful training themselves: “particularly in the early days of a conflict, the group may lack a cadre of skilled, experienced fighters who can pass on their knowledge to new recruits” (Byman et al, 2001:92). There are certain techniques and weapon systems that require a specialized set of skills which can be taught by a foreign government. An important reason why this is valuable for rebels is the fact that they often do not possess the best tools to fight (often) stronger government troops. When training is being
provided, one can expect that rebels will be more successful in their violent campaign against the government. When this results in taking new land and looting enemy soldiers, this can generate income. For that reason, rebels might start acting more independent from the civilian population and are less in need of civilian support. However, it is important to underline that the link with an increased resource accessibility is less strong, then in case of the critical forms of support. It is likely that this form of support comes together with material support, like bulletproof vests or small arms. In that case it will have combined a greater effect on rebel’s accessibility to resources.

Weapon- and material support
A second valuable form of support is considered to be weapons and materiel. For reasons in terms of fighting strength, small arms are important for a rebel group. These weapons do not have to be provided by foreign supporters directly. However, the market for these weapons has been overloaded with small arms (Byman, et al., 2001). Viewed from a resource accessibility approach, this form of support does seem to contribute only slightly to a decreasing need for a relationship between rebels and civilians. The less significant effect on the relation with civilians can be connected to the fact that these small arms are often easy to obtain for a relatively low price. Only in case the provision of weapons comes together with another form of support, like logistics or troops, it seems to have a significant effect on resource accessibility and consequently civilian victimization.

Minor forms of foreign support
The third category of foreign support to rebel groups, as also indicated by Bryman, et al (2001), is called ‘minor forms of support’.

Fighters
The provision of fighters can be seen as a minor form of support, even though it can be of high importance for the receiving rebel group (Bryman, et al., 2001). As stated in section 2.3, human capital is, besides material to fight and to live, the most important resource for a rebel group. Rebels need to reach a critical mass of fighters in order for them to be able to start to make tangible differences in their fight and get closer to their strategic aims. This of course means that it is not just any person that can join a rebel group. Instead a rebel group needs suitable fighters. Providing fighters as a form of foreign support is often focused on support for native warring parties (Byman, et al., 2001). – like foreign fighters traveling from all parts
of the world to Syria and Iraq to fight for ISIL or other Jihad groups (Hegghammer, 2011). A strong asset for rebel groups to receive foreign fighters is that they may lack certain expertise, for example on advanced weapon systems: “A new generation of fighters has emerged who are comfortable as terrorists, recruiters, trainers and media propagandist, among other specialties (Mendelsohn, 2011:189). However, important to underline is the fact that rebel group do in most cases not rely on external fighters. When they do, this can provide the sign that the rebel group is not properly organized, that it is weak, and that not a sufficient number of people feel attracted by the rebels’ overall cause (Byman, et al., 2001). Another important disadvantage for rebel groups of relying on foreign fighters is the fact that these fighters are less bound to the aim of the group and can alter their allegiances. That also links to the fact that these outside insurgents are not always of positive added value to the cause of the rebel group (Byman, et al., 2001). Overall, the study expects that receiving foreign fighters does not increase resource accessibility for rebel groups and consequently does not decrease the support needed of the local population. This paper expects the opposite to happen, as more foreign fighters need to be taken care of by the rebel group, which requires more resources in terms of money, material, logistics and food. These are all elements which can be gained through the local population. Based on this one would expect that foreign fighters do not decrease the need for local support and consequently do not increase the amount of civilian victimization.

The theoretical hypothesis that can be derived from the theoretical framework on the relationship between foreign support and civilian victimization is the following:

**HYPOTHESIS 1: (H1)**

*Foreign support that makes the rebel groups more independent from the population will lead to more civilian victimization.*

Hypothesis 1 can be accepted once the analysis shows a positive correlation between the three critical forms of support and civilian victimization.

**Secessionism**

An important aspect to consider within the link between foreign support and civilian victimization is that rebel behavior in general differs depending on the type of civil war.
Specifically, Fazal (2013) claims that secessionists\(^7\) are less likely to victimize civilians. He cites two reasons for this claim. Firstly, within the area in which the secessionists operate, they are most likely the greatest military power. It will consequently be unlikely that they will victimize civilians who could later become part of the independent state they are fighting to achieve. Secondly, because secessionists place a high importance on their international reputation. In order to gain actual independence, a rebel group needs to have more than just physical control over territory. The rebels also require international recognition by the international community in order to gain legitimacy and an independent status. A crucial way for rebels to increase the legitimacy of their territorial claim and of their identity is to comply with international (humanitarian) law in all their actions, including the laws against targeting civilians (ICRC.org, 2015).

Besides Fazal (2013), there are several other studies which also provide reasons for assuming that secessionist fighters are less likely to victimize civilians. Jo & Simmons (2013) for example argue also in line with this argument by stating that rebels who seek to increase their governance power – like secessionist - are less likely to victimize civilians and that they are more focused on their international reputation. Another study that points in this direction is that of Keller (2013), which argues that rebel groups fighting for an ideology are more likely to use terrorism than rebel groups focusing on secessionism. In line with Fazal, Keller (2013:2) states: “Secessionist rebels, which are often associated (and more often than not synonymous with) ethnic rebels, face different costs from non-secessionist rebels that reduce the likelihood they would employ traditionally-defined terrorist methods.”

However, there is an important factor that can on the other hand increase the civilian victimization: (ethnic) cleansing:

“(…) belligerents’ appetite for territorial conquest leads to civilian victimization when the territory they seek to annex is inhabited by enemy noncombatants, which typically occurs in wars of territorial expansion or when hostilities break out between intermingled ethnic groups that claim the same territory as their homeland” (Downes, 2006: 154)

\(^7\) The definition of secessionism used in this paper is “a nation that actively seeks to obtain independence from their sovereign” (Griffiths, 2015:3).
Following this logic, secessionists might, contrary to the argument before by Fazal (2013), actually have strong incentives to victimize civilians when the conflict centers around non-ethnics living in a territory that the secessionists wish to take over. As secessionist rebels generally possess a certain territory, they also have among others fighting and organizational capabilities that make them more able to conduct cleansing and mass atrocities.

Stanton (2013), contrary to Fazal (2013), claims that secessionists are more likely to engage in civilian victimization, focusing on the occurrence of terrorism. This is for the simple reason that secessionists are considered rebels with exclusionary aims that are more likely to use violence against civilians outside their group. Rebels with inclusive aims, that focus for example on a coup, do not take the risk of victimizing civilians as they are part of their domestic constituents and the ones from which they receive support. Another important reason why secessionist rebels are more likely to engage in violence against civilians is the fact that for them, the future does not look very encouraging. It happens very rarely that rebels with secessionist aims actually win a war (Fazal, 2013). Moreover, it is much more challenging for them to receive international legitimacy, as it is for revolutionary rebels. For that reason, it is not efficient for this group to use non-violent means (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Based on that, one could argue that secessionists engage more often in civilian victimization. Though, when doing that, their future will not look much more encouraging: “(...) violent secessionist campaigns are also extremely likely to fail” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:73).

An explaining factor for civilian victimization by secessionist rebel groups can be reciprocity, after civilian victimization by a government has taken place (Fazal, 2013). An interesting example, mentioned by Fazal (2013), is the case of the Chechens. This secessionist rebel group targeted civilians out of revenge because their constituents were victimized by the Russian government. It reached international attention when the Chechens targeted a theater in Moscow in 2002 and a school in Beslan in 2004, killing hundreds of civilians. This is a clear case of secessionists victimizing civilians outside their borders.

Based on the presented counter arguments to Fazal (2013) and the overall link between foreign support and civilian victimization (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014) this paper claims that secessionist rebels are more inclined to victimize civilians when they receive
foreign support. As stated before, previous research claims that secessionists are generally in need of positive recognition on an international stage. However, when secessionists receive external support, one could argue that they are receiving strong recognition from an important allied actor. This could make the rebels less concerned about their international position and more inclined to victimize civilians. This reasoning is based on short-term calculation by rebels, when they are able to secure territory through foreign support. This short-term calculation can also be found in the grounds for victimizing civilian, no thinking about the longterm consequences of perpetrating atrocities. This study derives the following hypothesis from that claim:

**HYPOTHESIS 2**: (H2)

*Secessionist rebels that receive foreign support are more likely to victimize civilians, then secessionist rebels that do not receive foreign support.*

Hypothesis 2 can be accepted once the analysis shows a positive correlation foreign support for secessionist rebels and civilian victimization.

**Control Variables**

This study controls the statistical test for two control variables: population size and GDP. It controls for population size as one could reason that a country with a larger population experiences more civilian victimization as there is simply more opportunity for. However, population density would have been an appropriate alternative in this case, as that would take the size of the country into account. The study controls for GDP as one can expect that countries with a lower GDP attract more foreign support, while they also more often experience armed conflict.

**SECTION 3 – RESEARCH DESIGN**

**Measuring the dependent variable: civilian victimization**

The operationalization of civilian victimization used in this paper is based on the UCDP’s operationalization of the concept for the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset. The UCDP established the word ‘one-sided violence’ in 2002, which it theoretically defines as: “The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against
civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year” (Eck, Sollenberg & Wallensteen, 2004: 136). This excludes the killing of people that are held in custody and it means that one-sided violence can take place within occasions not being defined as an armed conflict, following UCDP’s definition of armed conflict. The separate parts of this definition have to be operationalized in order to be able to measure the presence of the concept. The operationalization of civilian victimization, as used for the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset, is the following (Eck & Hultman, 2007a:2).

One can speak of civilian victimization, once each separate concepts of the theoretical definitions meets the following requirements (Eck & Hultman, 2007a:2):

1) The use of arms force can be seen as the “use of arms in order to exert violent force, resulting in death.”
   a. Arms are “any material means, e.g. manufactured weapons but also sticks, stones, fire, water, etc.”

2) 25 deaths are counted as ‘a minimum of 25 civilian deaths per year and per actor.’

3) The government is ‘the party controlling the capital of the state’

4) A formally organized group is ‘any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force.’

5) A state is:
   a. ‘an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory,
   or
   b. ‘an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory.’

6) Extra judicial killings in custody are taking place ‘when the government of a state kills a person in its custody’
   a. It is being seen as custody ‘when the person is located in a prison or another type of governmental facility.’

Measuring the independent variable: Foreign Support

Supplies from abroad for a rebel group during an armed conflict have been coded as foreign support to a warring party based on the theoretical definitions, as stated in the theoretical
The first variable being analyzed is called ‘Receiving Foreign Support’ which indicates if a rebel group received any form of support. This is being measured by its score on any of the different kinds of support, as being operationalized in the follow paragraphs. Based on the available data, there are nine different categories of foreign support, which are operationalized below. Based on the theoretical framework, those nine they are divided among the degrees of importance concerning their influence on the resource accessibility for rebel groups. Some of these variables are not included within the theoretical section outlining the division by Brymen, et el. (2001). Those are however placed under one of the degrees based on their possible contribution to rebel’s access to resources and consequently rebel’s dependency on civilians.

**Critical forms of support**
- Troops as secondary warring party
- Access to territory
- Funding and/or economic support

**Valuable forms of support**
- Weapons
- Access to military or intelligence infrastructure / Joint Operations
- Material and/or logistical support
- Training and/or expertise

**Minor forms of support**
- Intelligence support
- Other forms of support
- Unknown type of support

Since the statistical software STATA shows that a few types of foreign support highly correlate with each other, they have to be collapsed in order to be able to detect a difference between them.

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8 See also Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér (2011a:5).
The study collapses the following forms of support:

1) Weapons + Materiel/Logistics + Training/Expertise
2) Intelligence Material + Other Forms of Support

**Measuring the interaction term: Secessionism**

Within this study a secessionist movement is being operationalized as ‘a nation that actively seeks to obtain independence from their sovereign’ (Griffiths, 2015:3). The dataset of Griffiths uses the criteria as set in a previous study on secessionist movement by Coggin (2011), and will be as such also used within this paper. Important to underline is that rebels that are aiming at only overthrowing the central government are not seen as secessionist. The same goes for groups that only pursue a certain degree of autonomy within their country (Fazal, 2013).

**Measuring the control variables: GDP and population size**

The GDP per capita is measured as the real GDP per capita in constant U.S. dollars with the base year 2005 (Gleditsch, 2002). The population size simply projects the size of the population, based on estimates from several different other databases consulted by Gleditsch (2002).

**Data sources and their reliability**

To test both H1 and H2, this study employs the UCDP Dyadic Dataset v. 1-2014, 1946 – 2013 (Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen, 2008). This dataset includes all conflict dyads from 1946 till 2013. For measuring the kind of external support that warring parties receive, the paper makes use of the External Support Dataset, established by the UCDP (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011). This dataset consists of information on external support in intrastate-armed conflicts. The paper uses the One-side Violence Dataset, version 1.4-2014 (Eck & Hultman, 2007) by the UCDP to measure civilian victimization. To determine if a rebel group has secessionist war aims, this paper makes use of the ‘Secessionist Movements, version 3’ dataset, compiled by Griffiths (2015). The paper uses the ‘Expanded GDP and Trade

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9 A limitation of this dataset is that Correlates of War (CoW) uses a different definition of armed conflict than the UCDP. CoW focuses on a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve-month period, while UCDP focuses on least 25 battle-related deaths within a twelve-month period. Merging both dataset for that reason requires an individual
Dataset’ by Gleditsch (2002) in order to control for the economic situation in the country where the conflict takes place.

SECTION 4 – ANALYSIS

Overview of the results

The results are being presented into two different models. Regression model 1 analyses the correlation between different kinds of foreign support and civilian victimization perpetrated by rebels in all civil wars from 1989 till 2009 of which at least one side was a rebel group. Regression model 2 focuses on a possible interaction effect with secessionism, by analyzing the correlation between the different kinds of foreign support and civilian victimization in the case of secessionist rebel groups only. By using ZINB regression models, the study anticipates on the fact that fatality rates of zero are much more common than cases where the fatality rate is positive (Hall, 2000). As the data in regression model 1 shows, only 305 of the 1075 intrastate conflicts between 1989 and 2009 show victimized civilians. The other 770 armed conflicts don’t show any case of civilian victimization. The same goes for dataset 2, where only 80 out of 307 cases show civilian victimization, the rest of the cases consists of zero observations.

Regression Model 1: foreign support for rebel groups

Regression Model 1 in Table 4.1 is divided into four separate sub-ZINB regression models - A, B, C and D - for two reasons. Firstly, because that makes it possible to test different related theoretical assumptions. For example generating a model with only the independent variable ‘Receiving foreign support’ makes it possible to see if this study is in line with previous research claiming a positive correlation between general foreign support and civilian victimization. Secondly, the division between four models makes it possible to show how the regression coefficients change, when more independent (control-) variables are included.

assessment and coding of conflicts not recorded in the CoW dataset, but that are recorded in the UCDP dataset.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Log likelihood</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>Nonzero observations</th>
<th>Zero observations</th>
<th>Wald chi2</th>
<th>Prob&gt;chi2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>-2485.398</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>36.69</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>-244,9693</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>57.89</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-2442.614</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>95.35</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>-242.8051</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>113.47</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.2: Zero-Inflated Binomial Regression Model 1

![Table 4.2](image)

**Fatality Estimate (civilian victimization) (count equation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidence Rate</th>
<th>Incidence Rate</th>
<th>Incidence Rate</th>
<th>Incidence Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.276)</td>
<td>(1.276)</td>
<td>(1.276)</td>
<td>(1.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: troops as secondary warring party</td>
<td>-2.041***</td>
<td>-2.041***</td>
<td>-2.041***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.743)</td>
<td>(0.743)</td>
<td>(0.743)</td>
<td>(0.743)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: access to military or intelligence infrastructure / joint operations</td>
<td>-0.641</td>
<td>-0.641</td>
<td>-0.641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: access to territory</td>
<td>2.41*</td>
<td>2.41*</td>
<td>2.41*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: weapons, Material/Logistics and Training/Expertise</td>
<td>-0.705</td>
<td>-0.705</td>
<td>-0.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: funding/economic support</td>
<td>4.20***</td>
<td>4.20***</td>
<td>4.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: intelligence material and other forms of support</td>
<td>-1.587</td>
<td>-1.587</td>
<td>-1.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.843)</td>
<td>(0.843)</td>
<td>(0.843)</td>
<td>(0.843)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: unknown support</td>
<td>-0.483***</td>
<td>-0.483***</td>
<td>-0.483***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0896)</td>
<td>(0.0896)</td>
<td>(0.0896)</td>
<td>(0.0896)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>159,777***</td>
<td>159,777***</td>
<td>159,777***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21,182)</td>
<td>(21,182)</td>
<td>(21,182)</td>
<td>(21,182)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Probability of zero fatality (civilian victimization)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives Foreign Support</td>
<td>-0.617***</td>
<td>-0.666</td>
<td>-0.743*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.412)</td>
<td>(0.412)</td>
<td>(0.412)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vuong Test (calculated without robust standard errors): 13.66***

*significant at 10% (P<0.1); **significant at 5% (P<0.05); ***significant at 1% (P<0.01).
Model 1A

The first model indicates that receiving foreign support increases the probability of civilian victimization. As ‘Receiving Foreign Support’ is a binomial variable, it can only indicate foreign support or no foreign support. The direction of the correlation is in line with the theoretical expectation of Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) that foreign support increases the probability of civilian victimization. However, one needs to take into consideration that the extent of foreign support is not specified and it can consist of a wide range of types of support. Within the output of STATA – the default correlation number is 1,13. When one calculates the exponent of that, it leads to the following IRR number: \( \exp (1.131) = 3.098 \) as indicated in the model. To indicate the % change one can multiply this number by 100, which results in 309,8%. The meaning of this number is that when a rebel group is in some way being supported by a foreign actor, one can expect an increase of 309,8% of the amount of civilians being victimized. As there are no other variables included in the model there are no other variables need to be held constant. The outcome is significant at the 95% confidence interval.

A percent-change of 309,8% can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, it is a logit model that does not produce a linear line, but a line with a changing steepness along the Y. This percentage shows that an increase from 1 to 3 civilians being victimized is the same step as an increase from roughly 300 to 900. The size of the percentage can be theoretically explained by the fact that the victimization of 1 to 3 persons is the same step in terms of the likelihood that it happens, as going up from 300 to 900. When civilian victimization already takes place on a large, and growing scale, continuing victimization is likely to happen with larger and larger steps as the victimization not independent from each other. This means that the amount of killings in civil conflict rises exponential. Secondly, this number can be statistically explained by pointing at the fact that the numbers are so dispersed, which is also related to reason one. There are a couple of peak observations of civilians being victimized, like 30.110 (Government of the DR Congo (Zaire) and the AFDL, 1996) and 8360 (Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995). While the mean is 104 and most of the non-zero observations are clustered between 20 and 100. This means that at some point, the numbers need to grow enormously in order to predict among others those two peak observations. In general most conflicts in the dataset that do experience civilian victimization, score around the mean of 104. This explanation also applies to the percentages indicating the change in civilian victimization in the other models.
Model 1B

Model 1B consists of a ZINB-regression analyzing the effect of the different manners of foreign support on the probability of civilian victimization. This regression makes it possible to detect a difference in the effects of those different support forms, which is the main focus of this study. Four forms of foreign support are showing a positive significant IRR, which is in line with the theoretical argument that foreign support leads to an increasing probability of civilian victimization. The following four show a positive correlation with civilian victimization: 1) the provision of troops as secondary warring party, 2) the provision of access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations, 3) the provision of weapons, material and logistics and training and expertise and 4) intelligence material and other forms of support.

The IRR of ‘Foreign Support: troops as secondary warring party’ indicates 3,102, which means a change of 310,2%. That leads to the conclusion that the provision of troops as secondary warring party leads to an increase in the amount of civilians being victimized with 310,2%, holding all the other variables in the model constant. That outcome is significant at the 90% confidence interval, which means that the null hypothesis can be rejected. The IRR of ‘Foreign Support: access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations’ indicates 2,041, which means that when access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations is being provided to a rebel group in an armed conflict, the amount of civilians being victimized increase with 204,1%, holding all other variables constant, at a confidence interval of 95%. The IRR of ‘Foreign Support: weapons, Material/Logistics and Training/Expertise’ indicates 2,41, meaning that the provision of troops as secondary warring party increases the amount of civilians being victimized with 241,2%, holding all the other variables in the model constant, at a confidence interval of 90%. Lastly, the variable ‘Foreign Support: intelligence material and other forms of support’ indicates 4,023, meaning that the provision of intelligence material and other forms of support’ increases the amount of civilians being victimized with 402,3%, within a confidence interval of 90%.

Concluding, Model 1B is partly in line with the paper theoretical expectations. It shows that 1) the provision of troops as secondary warring party, 2) the provision of access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations, 3) the provision of weapons, material and logistics and training and expertise and 4) intelligence material and other forms of support, contribute to a significantly larger amount of civilians being victimized.
However, the model does not show a clear significant effect of the provision of the access to territory, provision of funding or economic support and unknown support. The first two show even the opposite IRR. Although, they cannot be interpreted as they are not significant. This result is remarkable, as both access to territory and economic support/funding are according to the paper’s theoretical expectations both crucial forms of support. That means that one would expect that they increase resource accessibility, diminish the need for civilian support and consequently increase the probability of civilian victimization. The inflation coefficients in the lower part of the model are in terms of the directions of the coefficients: they show a negative coefficient when the respective independent variable leads to an expected decrease of civilian victimization. Though, only the provision of access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations can be considered to show a significant effect at the confidence interval of 99,5%.

**Model 1 C**

The third model is a slight change from the second, as it includes the control variable secessionism. It shows that in line with the theoretical expectations of among others Fazal (2013), secessionism correlates negatively with civilian victimization. This means that when a rebel group is a secessionist group instead of a rebel group with any different war aims, like revolutionary ones, the expected number of civilians victimized would decrease by a factor 0,483, which is 48,3%, holding all other variables constant. This number is significant at the 99% confidence level, indicates a relatively strong certainty of the effect.

**Model 1D**

The fourth model is the extended model, including the control variables ‘Log Population’ and ‘Log GDP’. Including control variables, makes it possible to isolate the effect of the individual independent variables on the dependent variable from the other independent variables that are included. Model 1D shows that the following manners of foreign support correlate positively with civilian victimization: 1) the provision of troops as secondary warring party, 2) the provision of access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations, and 3) intelligence material and other forms of support. The correlation between weapons, Material/Logistics and Training/Expertise and civilian victimization diminishes after the inclusion of the last two control variables. That change
could point at the fact that it was a spurious relationship created by an antecedent. This means that another variable drove the result, when that variable was not included in the model.

Theoretically, one could explain this change by making the assumption that countries with a great population require more support of weapons, Material/Logistics and Training/Expertise, while at the same time a higher population size correlates with more civilian victimization. The same reasoning could be applied to LogGDP, even though that is not statistically significant. One could argue that a lower GDP, require more weapons, Material/Logistics and Training/Expertise. While at the same time, countries with a lower GDP experience more civilian victimization as they are experiencing more civil conflict in general. In that case, GDP would be the variable creating the link between the provision of weapons, material/logistics and training/expertise and civilian victimization.

Concerning the significant results, the following can be concluded. Firstly, the provision of troops as secondary warring party shows a positive result of 4,147, meaning that this kind of support increases civilian victimization with 414,47%, keeping all the other variables constant, at a significance interval of 95%. Secondly, the provision of access to military and/or intelligence infrastructure and/or joint operations provides an IRR of 2,041, meaning that that this kind of support increases civilian victimization with 204,1%, keeping all the other variables constant, at a significance interval of 90%. Finally, the provision of intelligence material and other forms of support indicates a positive IRR of 8,653, meaning that this type of foreign support leads to an increase of civilian victimization of 865,3%, holding all the other variables in the model constant. The inflation coefficients in the lower part of the model are all in line with the expectations by showing a negative coefficient when the respective independent variable leads to an expected decrease of civilian victimization.

Concluding, this means that the only critical form of foreign support that correlates with civilian victimization is the provision of troops as secondary warring party, which is in line with the theoretical expectations. However, the fact that access to territory and the provision of funding/economic support do not show a significant positive coefficient runs counter to this study’s theoretical expectations. A valuable form of support that is in line with the theoretical expectations is the provision of access to military and/or intelligence infrastructure and/or joint operations. Surprisingly, the minor form of support, being the provision of intelligence material and other forms of support shows a positive correlation with civilian
victimization. Though, based on the theory, one would not expect that providing this increase the resource accessibility for rebels and by that indirectly increases civilian victimization.

Regression Model 2: foreign support for secessionist rebel groups

The following regression models have been generated using dataset 2, which only includes intra state conflicts that involve rebel groups with secessionist war aims. The aim of this regression is to analyze if secessionism is an interaction effect between (types of) foreign support and civilian victimization. Regression Model 2 is divided into two different sub models, for similar reasons as Regression Model 1 is split up in four sub models. Model 2A includes only the variable ‘Receiving Foreign Support’. The second model, 2B, is the extensive version including the independent variables covering the different kinds of foreign support, GDP and population size.

Important to notice about the dataset this model employs is the fact that the amount of observations analyzed is relatively low. There are 307 observations, of which only 80 are non-zero. The rule of thumb within statistics is that every variable in a datasets needs to have at least 10-20 observations in order to be appropriate for statistical analysis. This dataset, consisting of 8 variables, is very much on the border of that rule of thumb. In other words it is pushing the limits of interpretable statistics, which creates reasons to take the outcome with a grain of salt. The size of the dataset is also the reason why the regression does not include the variable ‘Foreign Support: unknown support’, as the statistics software is not able to generate an IRR and an inflation coefficient, due to too few observations.
| Model | Log likelihood | Number of observations | Nonzero observations | Zero observations | Wald chi2 | Prob>|chi2| |
|-------|----------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------|-----------|----------|
| A     | -663.454       | 307                    | 80                   | 227              | 8.24      | 0.0041   |
| B     | -595.95        | 307                    | 80                   | 227              | 78.46     | 0.0000   |

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<tr>
<th>Table 4.3 Zero-Inflated Binomial Regression Model 2</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Incidence Rate</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Fatality Estimate (civilian victimization) (count equation)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Receiving Foreign Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: troops as secondary warring party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Support: access to military or intelligence infrastructure / joint operations</td>
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<td>Foreign Support: access to territory</td>
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<td>Foreign Support: funding/economic support</td>
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<td>Foreign Support: intelligence material and other forms of support</td>
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<td>Log population</td>
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<td>Log GDP</td>
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| **Probability of zero fatality (civilian victimization) (inflation equation)** | **Coefficient** |
| **Fatality Estimate (civilian victimization) (count equation)** | (Standard Error) | (Standard Error) |
| Receiving Foreign Support | -0.948*** | (0.270) |
| Foreign Support: troops as secondary warring party | -1.06 | (0.682) |
| Foreign Support: access to military or intelligence infrastructure / joint operations | -0.182 | (0.395) |
| Foreign Support: access to territory | -0.642 | (0.426) |
| Foreign Support: weapons, Material/Logistics and Training/Expertise | -0.733 | (0.390) |
| Foreign Support: funding/economic support | -0.119 | (0.378) |
| Foreign Support: intelligence material and other forms of support | -0.504 | (1.36) |
| Log population | -0.442*** | (0.105) |
| Log GDP | -0.031 | (0.196) |
| _cons | 6,806*** | (2.406) |

* significant at 5% (0.05); ** significant at 1% (0.01); *** significant at 0.5% (0.005)
Model 2A
Model 2A shows the correlation between the provision of foreign support and civilian victimization. This model experiences a similar shortcoming as in Regression Model 1A: it does not indicate the kind of foreign support or the extent of the support. Though, in light of the paper’s aims, the crucial conclusion that can be drawn is that the regression output is in line with the paper theoretical expectations. It indicates that foreign support for rebel groups with secessionist war aims leads to more civilian victimization. It provides an IRR of 4,957, meaning that foreign support to secessionist rebel groups leads to 495.7% more civilians being victimized than for secessionist rebels that do not receive foreign support. This IRR is significant under a confidence interval of 99.5%. Based on the low amount of observations, the specific strength of the correlation should not be taken to literally. Though, the direction of the effect is completely in line with the paper’s theoretical expectations.

Model 2B
Model 2B shows the relationship between the different types of foreign support and the control variables GDP and population size and the rate of civilian victimization. Striking about this model is that overall the IRR coefficients are relatively high. Especially in the case of the provision of troops as secondary warring party and the provision of intelligence material and other forms of support. The results are so high, that one can assume that there is something happening within the regression model that requires further research. Firstly, there could be multicollinearity. That means that two or more of the independent variables are highly correlated with each other. However, a correlation matrix of the independent variables does not show that they correlate (see Appendix, section 6). More likely is that certain outliers in the dataset completely determine the strength of some of the IRR coefficients, due to the low number of observations. One of those observations could for example be the case of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina fighting against the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. The Serbian rebels experienced 8360 civilians being victimized. This observation can be considered an outlier compared to the other cases of civilian victimization. Most importantly, the Serbian rebels received intelligence material and other forms of support. It is likely that that single observation creates the high exponent of 35,086 for the variable ‘Foreign Support: intelligence material and other forms of support’.

Because it is important to be reserved in establishing conclusions based on the exact numbers of the IRR’s of Regression Model 2, this study only focuses on the directions of the
coefficients and their significance. The provision of 1) troops as secondary warring party, 2) funding/economic support and 3) intelligence material and other forms of support all show a positive significant correlation with civilian victimization.

SECTION 5 – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The ZINB regression analysis of Regression Model 1 analyzes the main paper’ research question. Based on the output, the question - Does the type of foreign support to rebels affect civilian victimization? – can be answered with a ‘yes’. There is a different effect of different types of foreign support on the occurrence of civilian victimization. When looking at model 1D which includes the control variables GDP and the population size, the following three types of foreign support have a positive, statistically significant effect on the rate of civilian victimization: 1) the provision of troops as secondary warring party, 2) the provision of access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations and 3) the provision of intelligence material and other forms of support. This means that ‘within’ the effect of foreign support on civilian victimization, the provision of troops, access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations and intelligence material in the end are the externally provided resources which cause the increase in civilian victimization.

Based on the above presented answer to the research question, the answer to the sub question D - ‘What is the effect of ‘critical forms of support’ on civilian victimization?’ - is that only the provision of troops as secondary warring party can be seen as a critical form of support that has significant influence on civilian victimization. This means that the other two crucial forms of support territory and funding/economic support are not showing any correlation with civilian victimization.

Sub question E – ‘What is the effect of ‘valuable forms of support’ on civilian victimization?’ – can be answered by the fact that the provision of access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations shows a positive correlation with civilian victimization. However, the other valuable form of support in this study, the provision of weapons, material and logistics and training and expertise, does not show any significant correlation with civilian victimization. That is remarkable as those are more tangible forms of support that can directly affect the resource accessibility of rebels.
The third sub question F – What is the effect of ‘minor forms of support’ on civilian victimization? – can be answered by the fact that the provision of intelligence material and other forms of support has a strong influence on civilian victimization. This is a relatively strong result, but should however be taken with some caution, which is again remarkable. As the theoretical framework expects that this minor form of support does not have any strong effect on the rebel’s behavior towards civilians.

Sub question G - What is the effect of foreign support to rebels with secessionist war aims on civilian victimization? – can be answered with the fact that there seems to be an effect, but that this needs to be taken with some caution as the dataset is relatively small. However, the IRR coefficients shows a clearly positive significant result which can be interpreted as statistically significant positive effect.

Sub question H - What is the effect of different types of foreign support to rebels with secessionist war aims on civilian victimization? – can only be answered with a large grain of salt. The regression shows that the provision of 1) troops as secondary warring party, 2) funding/economic support and 3) intelligence material and other forms of support show a positive significant correlation with civilian victimization.

Theoretical expectations and testing the hypothesis

**HYPOTHESIS 1**: (H1)

*Foreign support that makes the rebel groups more independent of the population will lead to more civilian victimization.*

Based on the paper analysis, the study is not able to completely confirm H1 and needs to reject it. The regression analysis shows that not all critical forms of foreign support lead to more civilian victimization. Only the provision of troops shows a significant positive correlation with civilian victimization.

**HYPOTHESIS 2**: (H2)

*Secessionist rebels that receive foreign support are more likely to victimize civilians, then secessionist rebels that do not receive foreign support.*
Based on the results of the regression analysis, H2 can be accepted. The regression analysis shows that foreign support for secessionist rebels increases the probability that civilians are being victimized. This is in line with the theoretical expectation that secessionist rebels receiving foreign support tend to care less about their international reputation, as they already receive strong international recognition. Beyond this hypothesis, the study shows the tentative different effects of the different kinds of foreign support on civilian victimization by secessionist. However, as those results have to be taken with a grain of salt, one should only take the direction of the coefficients into account. The provision of 1) troops as secondary warring party, 2) funding/economic support and 3) intelligence material and other forms of support all show a positive correlation with civilian victimization. Remarkable about these results is that all critical forms of support (troops, funding and territory) are showing a positive effect. Which is a completely different effect compared to results used for testing H1. For that reason this result provides reason for further research.

**Reflection on the consequences for the theories**

Firstly, the link between foreign support and the increased probability of civilian victimization, as suggested by Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) can be confirmed in model 1A. However, based on this paper’s conclusions it is important to question the assumption that foreign support and civilian victimization positively correlate based on a change in resource accessibility for rebels and consequently a change in dependency on civilians. The results show that two out of three critical forms of support do not lead to higher probabilities of civilian victimization. That provides a strong argument to question the mechanism of resource accessibility as the explaining factor and requires moving the focus of future research towards other mechanisms that could explain why the provision of troops does correlate with civilian victimization, while the provision of territory and economic support does not. One could for example argue that the provision of external military attracts opportunistic recruits that see a chance in joining a rebel group that has a large potential of being successful. Another interesting focus on this relationship would be from the perspective of the troops that are being provided. Those combatants fight, comparable to mercenaries, for a different cause then in their national army. Within the used dataset they are always combatants provided by a state. It sounds likely that they will be less committed to the rebel’s cause and consequently less restrained in victimizing civilians in a war they possibly personally care less about.
Besides the fact that the critical forms of support do not strongly correlate with civilian victimization, it is important to take a closer look at the positive correlation between the provision of access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations and the probability of civilian victimization. Even though this is considered to be a ‘valuable form of support’ in this paper, as it provides material resources, one would not expect that to be the valuable form of support that correlates the most with civilian victimization. From the perspective of resource accessibility, it would make more sense if the provision of weapons, material/logistics and training/expertise would correlate positively with civilian victimization as that could enlarge both human capital and material capacity of rebels. The fact that it is the other way around creates a second challenge to resource accessibility as the explaining mechanism for understanding the correlation between foreign support and civilian victimization. Lastly it is especially remarkable that intelligence material and other forms of support show the strongest significant correlation with civilian victimization. This is the last kind of support one would expect to be linked with the amount of resources a rebel group has access to. One could argue that this increases the military capacity of rebels and makes them for that reason more capable of looting resources from civilians as an alternative way of gaining income. However, based on the existing theory on resources and civilian victimization, there is not a very strong alternative explanation possible to make here. The only potential explanation is the incentive of rebels to ‘show that they at least do something’ towards the government that supports them with intelligence material.

All in all is the consequence for the theory on the link between resources and civilian victimization that it needs to be critically reviewed. Since the critical forms of support are not the ones that determine the relationship between foreign support and civilian victimization, there is most likely an alternative mechanism working that requires further in depth research.

Concerning the theoretical expectations on civilian victimization among secessionist groups, the analysis finds interesting results. Model 2A shows a strong and significant positive effect between foreign support and civilian victimization in the case of secessionist rebel groups, as was expected by Fazal (2013). When looking in more detail at the effect of separate kinds of foreign support, then the results somehow show that the assumption of this study that the provision of critical forms of support leads to more civilian victimization works in case of secessionist groups. The provision of 1) troops as secondary warring party, 2) access to military or intelligence infrastructure and joint operations, 3) territory, 4) funding/economic
support and 5) intelligence material and other forms of support all show a positive correlation with civilian victimization. However, as this regression is very much pushing the limits of the statistical model, it would be good not take the differentiation between forms of support too much into consideration when reviewing the general theory of this study.

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