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Over the past decade, research security has moved from a technical concern discussed among specialists to a central issue in European research policy. What began as a debate about protecting sensitive technologies has expanded into a broader question about how knowledge should be governed in a changing geopolitical environment. Today, it shapes funding rules, international cooperation, and the everyday practices of universities across Europe, becoming part of a broader effort to govern knowledge flows amid geopolitical uncertainty and perceived vulnerability. It reflects a wider shift in how the European Union (EU) understands openness, collaboration, and risk.
In my ongoing research on EU research security and international academic cooperation (Pinna, 2024; Cai, Pinna and van der Wende, 2025; Pinna, 2025), I examine how this shift reflects more than a response to specific threats and is linked to the EU’s broader geopolitical repositioning and to the growing recognition that research and innovation are strategic domains. Policy debates increasingly frame scientific cooperation in terms of resilience, technological sovereignty, and economic security (European Commission 2025b) and are linked to the EU’s broader geopolitical repositioning and to the growing recognition that research and innovation are strategic domains.
For much of the early 2000s, EU research policy rested on the assumption that international openness was inherently beneficial. The development of the European Research Area (ERA), successive Framework Programmes, and mobility initiatives reflected a paradigm in which universities were encouraged to internationalise, compete globally, and integrate into the knowledge economy. International cooperation was tied to a neoliberal logic of competitiveness and excellence, where openness was seen as necessary for growth and scientific leadership.
Over time, this consensus began to change. Advances in dual-use technologies, the strategic importance of innovation, and geopolitical rivalry led policymakers to reconsider the risks of unrestricted collaboration. Scientific cooperation is now seen not only as a driver of competitiveness, but also as a source of vulnerability. Concerns about knowledge transfer, foreign interference, and asymmetric dependencies have moved to the centre of policy debates, especially in strategic technologies. Where the previous decade emphasised internationalisation as an economic imperative, the current one increasingly frames it through a security logic concerned with exposure, dependence, and risk.
These developments are particularly visible in EU–China academic relations. Earlier narratives emphasised partnership and mutual benefit, whereas recent debates refer to reciprocity, risk awareness, and strategic dependencies (Cai, Pinna, and van der Wende 2025). Cooperation continues, but under more cautious and conditional terms.
Recent EU initiatives reflect this recalibration. The Council Recommendation on Enhancing Research Security defines research security as the need to anticipate and manage risks related to unwanted knowledge transfer, malign influence on research, and violations of academic integrity or EU values (European Commission 2024a). Research security, therefore, goes beyond protecting technologies and includes safeguarding the conditions under which research remains open and trustworthy. The White Paper on dual-use R&D further highlights the overlap between civilian innovation and security concerns (European Commission 2024b). Together, these documents signal a move from unconditional openness to managed internationalisation.
This transformation has not taken the form of sudden restrictions. Instead, security concerns have been integrated into existing procedures.
Rather than imposing strict prohibitions, the EU mainly relies on regulatory and coordinative tools. Funding rules, due-diligence requirements, export controls, and risk assessments increasingly shape research cooperation. Recent Commission initiatives provide guidance and coordination tools for Member States (European Commission 2025a).
Because education and research remain largely national competencies, the implementation of research security is shaped by the relationship between the EU and its Member States. EU institutions set the direction, but Member States, funding agencies, universities, and researchers implement it. In this sense, research security develops through a multi-level governance system in which responsibilities are distributed rather than centrally imposed (Pinna 2024). Translating research security into practice is uneven across governance levels, with divergent narratives creating uncertainty for implementers and making the process more contested than official policy language suggests (Rüland et al. 2025).
The growing prominence of research security is closely connected to the EU’s wider geopolitical agenda. Since the late 2010s, EU policy has emphasised resilience, strategic autonomy, and reducing critical dependencies. Research and innovation are no longer seen only as drivers of growth, but as areas linked to security, competitiveness, and systemic vulnerability (European Commission 2025b).
This shift reflects not only the pursuit of power, but also growing concern about vulnerability within open research systems. Policymakers worry that openness may expose critical technologies, create dependencies, or allow foreign influence in sensitive areas. These concerns have led to new policy instruments in “like-minded” countries such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia, where governments introduced guidelines to help universities manage geopolitical risks in international collaboration (Shih, Chubb, and Cooney-O’Donoghue 2025). Comparative work also shows that in both Germany and the United States, research security is reshaping scientific cooperation under geopolitical pressure, though through different governance traditions (Rüffin et al. 2025).
The EU response remains distinctive. Rather than relying on direct restrictions, it mainly uses coordination, recommendations, and regulatory frameworks. Cooperation remains central, but with greater attention to exposure, dependence, and strategic capabilities. Research security, therefore, reflects an attempt to govern interdependence rather than abandon openness.
This transformation is also visible in policy language. Over the past decade, EU documents have moved from the vocabulary of openness and global exchange to terms such as responsible internationalisation, de-risking, and strategic autonomy. These changes reflect shifting narratives about how openness should be organised.
Earlier frameworks stressed partnership and mobility, whereas recent documents emphasise risk awareness, due diligence, and institutional responsibility. The Council Recommendation on research security places risk assessment and safeguards within normal research governance (European Commission 2024a). Openness is no longer taken for granted but must be actively managed.
This shift is often summarised in the principle that cooperation should be “as open as possible, as closed as necessary.” Initially used in technical contexts, this expression now captures a broader change in how international collaboration is understood. It reflects the attempt to preserve openness while recognising its risks.
This shift in language is particularly visible in EU–China academic relations. Earlier narratives centred on partnership and exchange, while more recent debates increasingly refer to risk management, strategic dependencies, and the protection of sensitive knowledge (Cai, Pinna, and van der Wende 2025; Pinna 2024). These changes reorganise expectations across the research system, redistributing responsibility among universities, funding agencies, and individual researchers.
Research security has become a defining feature of EU research policy. What began as concern about sensitive technologies has evolved into a broader effort to reconsider how knowledge circulates in an increasingly contested global environment.
The shift is visible both in policy instruments and in the language of international cooperation. Terms such as responsible internationalisation, strategic autonomy, and de-risking reflect a shift from openness as the default to a more cautious organisation of international cooperation.
For the EU, this reflects an effort to remain open while reducing vulnerabilities. For universities and researchers, collaboration continues but with stronger expectations of responsibility and risk awareness. Understanding this shift is essential for navigating European research governance. Research security is not simply a constraint on cooperation, but an attempt to redefine how international collaboration can continue in a more uncertain and contested world.
Dr. Cristina Pinna is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the Department of International Relations and International Organization, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Her research examines China’s global engagement, with particular interest in EU–China relations, the geopolitics of infrastructure and science and technology. She previously worked at the United Nations Development Programme in Beijing and has held research and teaching roles in Italy, Netherlands, Canada and China.
Cai, Yuzhuo, Cristina Pinna, and Marijk van der Wende, eds. 2025. Rethinking EU–China higher education cooperation in a complex and changing global environment. Special issue, Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 167–176. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153251316930
European Commission. 2024a. Council recommendation on enhancing research security. COM(2024) 26 final. Brussels.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=COM:2024:26:FIN
European Commission. 2024b. White paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential. Brussels.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0027
European Commission. 2025a. Commission announces new measures to strengthen research security. Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, 28 October. Brussels. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/commission-announces-new-measures-strengthen-research-security-2025-10-28_en
European Commission. 2025b. Strategic Autonomy and European Economic and Research Security. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-research-and-innovation/europe-world/international-cooperation/strategic-autonomy-and-european-economic-and-research-security_en
Pinna, Cristina. 2024. Navigating knowledge and research security in EU–China academic relations: The case of Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands. Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 319–343. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153241307970
Pinna, Cristina. 2025. Comparative Perspective In EU Context: Policies And Instruments In Relevant EU Countries. In van der Wende M., et al. (eds.) Changing perspectives: towards conditions for sustainable EU-China collaboration in academic cooperation and R&D. Published by the China Knowledge Network (CKN). https://www.chinakennisnetwerk.nl/publications/changing-perspectives-towardsconditions-sustainable-eu-china-academic-collaboration
Rüffin, Nicolas V., Katharina C. Cramer, Maximilian Mayer, and Philip J. Nock. 2025.
“Research Security’ in Germany and the United States: Shifting Governance of Scientific Collaboration Under Geopolitical Pressure. Global Policy, advance online publication, pp. 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70103
Rüland, Anna-Lena, Rüffin, Nicolas V., Wang, Ruowei and Mauduit, Jean-Christophe. 2025.
“The Implementation of Research Security Policies in Germany: Exploring Policy Narratives across Governance Levels.” European Security, advance online publication.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2025.2591708
Shih, Tommy, Chubb, Andrew and Cooney-O’Donoghue, Diarmuid. 2025. Processing the geopolitics of global science: Emerging national-level advisory structures. Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 300–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153241307971
This post has been originally published on Europe of Knowledge blog.