Anticorruption Beyond Formal Rules: Political and Administrative Responses in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract

Over the past three decades, Central and Eastern European countries have adopted significant anticorruption reforms to reach European standards. Research shows that corruption affects administrative and governance efficiency, while anti-corruption strategies in this region do not lead to the expected results. The panel examines the relationship between corruption and governance by focusing on how anti-corruption institutions operate in practice. Rather than treating corruption primarily as a consequence of weak norms or insufficient sanctions, the papers analyse how rules, procedures and political communication mediate the effects of anti-corruption policies. It brings together studies on administrative burden and informal practices, party rhetoric and voter perceptions in the context of corruption scandals, behavioural policy interventions in public procurement, and the role of administrative elites in delaying whistleblowing implementation. The papers show how anti-corruption institutions are filtered through intermediaries (citizens, bureaucrats, political actors, voters) who interpret and translate them into practice.

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