This paper examines the relationship between administrative burdens and corruption in post-socialist administrative systems. Building on the concept of administrative burden as developed by Pamela Herd and Donald Moynihan (2018), the study argues that excessive learning, compliance, and psychological costs embedded in bureaucratic procedures can unintentionally foster corrupt practices.
In many post-socialist states, formal regulatory frameworks have undergone extensive legal reform, often aligning with European Union standards. However, a persistent gap remains between formal rules and actual administrative behaviour. This paper suggests that one underlying cause of this discrepancy lies not only in weak enforcement or deficient ethical norms, but in the structural design of administrative procedures themselves, the choice architecture.
Where compliance with formal rules is excessively complex, time-consuming, or cognitively demanding, people face substantial barriers to lawful behaviour. Under such conditions, even individuals who would not ordinarily engage in corrupt conduct may resort to informal payments, personal connections, or procedural shortcuts in order to secure basic administrative outcomes. Corruption thus emerges not solely as a product of immoral intent, but as a rational adaptation to disproportionately burdensome administrative systems.
By conceptualizing corruption partly as a behavioural response to excessive administrative costs, the study contributes to both the administrative burden literature and corruption research. It highlights the need to reconceptualize anti-corruption strategies: reducing procedural complexity and cognitive load may be as important as strengthening sanctions and accountability mechanisms.
