From Metaphysics to Politics: The Distinction Between Distributive Unity and Collective Unity in Perpetual Peace

Abstract

Speaker: Giovanni Sarto, State University of Campinas and University of Lille In Kant’s published works, there are four references to the distinction between distributive unity and collective unity. The first two occur in Critique of Pure Reason, where distributive unity is attributed to the activity of the understanding and collective unity to the activity of reason. However, this distinction, which one might initially take to be purely epistemological, reappears in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason in order to characterise the difference between natural religion as moral, which holds universally for 'every human being (universitas vel omnitudo distributiva),' and a church that may exist as the expression of a 'universal union (omnitudo collectiva)' (RGV, AA 06: 157). Although it belongs to a completely different domain, the structure of this latter differentiation is taken up again in the first appendix to Perpetual Peace, where Kant distinguishes between 'the volitions of all individuals,' as the 'distributive unity of the will of all,' and the 'collective unity of the united will,' understood as the moment or situation in which what is at stake is the willing of 'all together' (ZeF, AA 08: 371). By analysing all these instances, I focus on this fundamental distinction in order to understand the reason, the function, and the purpose for which Kant employs the same conceptual instrument in such disparate contexts. To this end, I also extend my investigation to the unpublished material, since in several Reflexionen Kant offers many clarifications concerning distributive and collective unity, in addition to other passages in which each of them is mentioned in isolation. The objective of the proposed presentation is twofold. On the one hand, in the first part of the presentation, I draw on this broader framework in order to explain the sense of the reference found in Perpetual Peace. On the other hand, in the second part, I seek to show that the distinction established there by Kant is fundamental for understanding certain of his formulations concerning relevant themes, such as his position on democracy, his critique of the Rousseauian concept of the general will, and his concept of idea. The hypothesis I seek to test is that Kant frequently draws on the distinction between distributive unity and collective unity to think through a central problem of his philosophy: the problem of totality. When Kant transposes this same conceptual vocabulary into the political domain, the problem at stake is thus that of totality, now considered within the sphere of politics but retaining its metaphysical roots. If this is the case, and if the themes mentioned above can indeed be traced back to this distinction, this would mean that, at least from a certain point of view, the problems of political philosophy are articulated through the conceptual resources of metaphysics.