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European Union Politics

European Union
Institutions
Negotiation
P107
Marius Radean
University of Essex

Building: Adam Smith, Floor: 11, Room: 1115

Thursday 11:00 - 12:40 (04/09/2014)


Abstract

The European Union has become an important area of research for theoretical and empirical scholars of analytical politics. This is not least due to the large number of decision making procedures, institutional reforms, enlargements, and legislative actors in the European Union that offer particularly specific tests of hypotheses from analytical politics on the implications of institutional design and conflicting interests. This panel invites papers that develop or test analytic models of EU lawmaking or new methods for empirical research against this background. The topics range from research on bargaining and consensus in EU legislation to veto players analyses and agent-based models of the decision making process.

Title Details
Strategic Agenda-Setting and Legislative Gridlock in the European Union View Paper Details
'Mention it, Don't Insist' Unanimity and Exposure in the EU Council of Ministers View Paper Details
Tracking Amendments to Legislation with a Novel Minimum-Edit-Distance Algorithm View Paper Details
How Group Size Affects the Dynamics of EU Decision-Making View Paper Details