'Mention it, Don't Insist' Unanimity and Exposure in the EU Council of Ministers

Recently, important contributions have been made to our understanding of decision-making dynamics in the EU Council of Ministers, and particularly its tendency to adopt policies by consensus. But these studies focus on legislative decision making under the qualified majority rule. There are reasons to assume that this logic works differently in decision making under unanimity, where each member state can form a blocking minority on its own. And where there is less of a prescribed deadline for reaching a decision. While member states’ motivations are essentially the same; to avoid marginalization, their bargaining strategy is different. While QMV negotiations are about building coalitions, unanimity negotiations are about avoiding high level exposure. We test this claim by means of a process tracing analysis of one prolonged debate, concerning Balkan enlargement. This debate is analyzed from the perspective of one particular member state, the Netherlands, who played a very prominent (obstructing) role.