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Accountability, Political Preferences and Bureaucratic Reputation

Public Administration
Regulation
Decision Making
P007
Tobias Bach
Universitetet i Oslo
Tobias Bach
Universitetet i Oslo

Saturday 14:00 - 15:40 (09/09/2017)

Building: BL27 Georg Sverdrups hus Floor: 3 Room: GS 3513

Abstract

Bureaucrats and regulators hold a central position in the policy process. This position can evolve over time. On the one hand, these actors can cultivate their reputation to consolidate and expand their political power, thereby shaping political preferences. On the other hand, accountability mechanisms may restrain and limit their reach or to the contrary, these can become important mechanisms for reputation-building and blame deflection. The interplay between these two features deserves a close inspection.
Title Details
The Political Power of Bureaucrats: Not only Agenda Shaping, but also Preference Shaping? View Paper Details
Designing Regulatory Accountability View Paper Details
Corporate Reputation in the Outsourced State View Paper Details
Organizational Reputation and EU Regulatory Agencies View Paper Details