Parties’ and Voters’ Response to Political Compromise

Abstract

Increasing trends of polarization and fragmentation of the political landscape worldwide make political compromise inevitable during and after the government formation process. The inability to agree and commit to political compromises comes at a huge price of unstable and short-lived government as well as legislative gridlock. Although compromises are a fact of politics in nearly every democracy, we know little about how voters perceive and respond to political compromise and what strategies parties use to minimize the electoral costs of political compromises. Are parties willing to compromise and when do they commit to policy compromise? Do they use compromise rhetoric to diminish electoral costs? And what is the impact of political compromise on votes and voting behaviour? Do voters perceive political compromise? Do voters incorporate their perceptions and expectations about policy compromise in their voting choice and how they do so? Do voters punish their parties for policy compromise, and when they do so? This panel brings together scholars investigating political compromise from both the party’s and voters’ perspective. Specifically, two papers focus on party strategies respectively during the election campaign and during the legislative terms. The three remaining papers centre their attention on voters examining both the influence of voters' perceptions of power sharing on their vote choice and voters’ reaction to coalition agreements. All papers rely on original data collected at either the party or voter level. As such, this panel favours an interdisciplinary approach to the topic of political compromise and aims to advance our knowledge and understanding of one of the most debated topics of recent politics.