Compensational Voting and Perceptions of Power Sharing and Compromise among Voters

The compensational-vote model provides a parsimonous yet comprehensive theory of decision making among voters. In her seminal contributions, Kedar (2005, 2009) proposes that voters in contexts with power sharing (e.g., coalitions) make choices based on their expectations of policy outcomes and policy compromise rather than their ideological proximity to parties. While existing empirical tests provide support for the theory, they rely on the assumption that voters' perceptions of power sharing are fixed in a given country. This paper reexamines the compensational-vote model by allowing perceptions of power sharing to vary among voters. We field survey questions in 12 European countries which for the first time directly measure voters' expectations of power sharing (expected vote shares), government composition, and policy compromise (expected position of the (coalition) government). This allows us to test whether and when voters entertain a naïve view of power sharing, which considers the shares of all parties in parliament, against a sophisticated view of power sharing, where voters also incorporate expectations about government composition and compromise in their decisions. Our findings have important implications for voter behavior and party strategies.