Whilst there is no doubt the EU acts geostrategically when making enlargement policy it does so within a normative framework. Perceived geostrategic value may expedite the progress of a candidate like Turkey but it will not enable it to bypass the Copenhagen criteria. Accordingly Turkey’s period of most rapid progress was between 2002 and 2004 when it was helped to make constitutional progress by its geostrategically motivated advocates within the EU.
The “Arab Spring” has re-highlighted Turkey’s geostrategic value to the EU. Accordingly it would seem to be an opportunity for progress towards membership to be made. However, the necessary constitutional reform looks very remote and the AKP much less likely to accept external “advice” than a decade ago. This paper argues that EU accession is now out of the hands of the EU, or its member states, and depends entirely on what happens next in Turkish politics.
