This Paper examines the competitive adaptation of illegal armed groups to the dynamics of large-scale coal extraction in Colombia. In the last twenty years, Colombia became the main source of coal for Europe and mining is considered an engine of economic development. Why did rebel groups fail to maintain territorial control, while paramilitary groups became geographically and economically dominant? This paper analyses the competing strategies of both rebel and paramilitary groups in regions dominated by coal extraction. Central to the analysis are the organizational strategies that illegal groups develop to control territory and population. The paper compares internal hierarchies, incentives, access to resources and contrasting relationships to local communities. The study argues that the strategies of illegal armed groups are conditioned by their contrasting relationships to the state. Variation in patterns of internal organisation interact with variation in patterns of external support to produce different outcomes. Paramilitary groups develop complementary relationships to state policies of security and development that allow them to maintain illegal activities of forced displacement and land dispossession. Rebel groups were unable to adapt because top-down internal hierarchies and consequent cultural beliefs presupposed a non-violent relationship with local inhabitants. Based on field research data in a large-scale coal mining region of Colombia, the paper provides an analytical framework explaining this complex interaction and the conditions under which it takes place. In the current context of a peace deal between rebels and the Colombian government, this paper is relevant to both scholars and policymakers confronted with the transformation of old and the potential emergence of new conflicts in a region characterized by the contested dominance of two competing and illegal armed groups.
