In ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’ Kant strictly separates Right from virtue. I will argue that such a strict division between Right and virtue is not tenable. Whereas Right may only demand compliance of our external actions with its prescriptions, virtue places the additional demand on us to comply with said prescriptions from the motive of duty. Kant further explains this distinction by means of an example. It is a duty of Right, he argues, to fulfill a contract one has entered into. If one does not respect the contract, one can be externally coerced to do so. Yet, fulfilling a contract is also an indirect duty of virtue, i.e. the ethical duty to fulfill a duty of Right from the motive of duty. It is thus a demand of ethics that, when external coercion is absent, the idea of duty should suffice to ensure compliance with the law.
Right merely demands the compliance of my external actions with its laws. It may enforce this compliance by means of external coercion, but it may not force me to adopt a maxim for acting, as that would amount to paternalism. I will argue, however, that in practice any legal system does depend on at least a majority of its subjects acting in accordance with its laws from the motive of duty. Yet this leads to the following paradox: How can Right depend on something – i.e. its subjects acting from the motive of duty – that it may not demand?
The solution to this paradox will be sought in ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ where Kant argues that the very act of living in a good ‘Rechtsstaat’ develops one’s virtue by instilling respect for the law in its subjects. Therefore, Right may not demand virtue, but it can help cultivate it, thus undoing the paradox.
