When talking about compensation for being imposed a risk, generally two options are considered. The first is that risk imposition may sometimes be permissible if compensation is offered to all those who are imposed a risk. The second is that some forms of risk imposition may be permissible if people for whom the risk will actually eventuate will be compensated.
This paper argues instead that there are important reasons to take the first option seriously and offers a qualified defense of the thesis that ex ante compensation to all those exposed to risk may present important practical advantages. The paper focuses on a particular proposal of ex ante compensation for health damages caused by exposure to environmental pollution. It proposes that risk worsens the life prospect of the victims of risk imposition.
In this framework compensation is not aimed at bringing back the status of welfare before risk imposition (indeed welfare may not diminish by risk per se), but to contribute positively to the prospects (overall freedom) of the victims of risk imposition. The proposal is that polluters should pay an administrative levy ex ante which is thought as a way of remedy to the new situation of the individuals who are at risk (so, for example, being individuals who have more probability to develop illnesses, to have their property decrease in value and so on…). The paper discusses advantages and disadvantages of this proposal compared with ex-post tort law and contractual solutions.
