After Washington Consensus, all over Latin America, ‘privatization’ was the rhythm of the politico-economical symphony and businessmen became a main part of the orchestra. Many of the services usually provided exclusively by the state were transferred –at least partially- to private hands, and security seems not to be the exception. Among different mechanisms put in place by non-state actors to provide security, those adopted by businessmen stand out, not only because they could be considered a ‘particular type’ of victims but also because privatizing security conveniently aligns with their privatizing drive.
This article aims to analyze different strategies that businessmen adopted since the late 90s in order to get protection in the middle of a violent and unsafe environment, such as the city of Guadalajara, Mexico. Those practices – some of which remain in place nowadays- could be limited to hiring a private security company – which is legally allowed -. However, they could also include paying racket, sponsoring armed-groups, or even creating self-protection groups, becoming potential violent agents themselves.
To which extent those private protection mechanisms nullify state agencies? Based on qualitative data, I argue that in order to safeguard their economic interests, businessmen do not substitute state agencies but co-produce security; thus, this is not a matter of weakening the role of the state agencies yielding some of its attributions to a private actor. To the contrary, local state agencies are strong enough to delegate strategically some security aspects, while keeping control on others.
Keywords: privatizing public security, self-protection mechanisms, businessmen in violent contexts.
