This paper will consider Kant's argument in the final section of Towards Perpetual Peace that politics, and especially the pursuit of peace and freedom from violence, so far from being contrary to morality, requires justice as a precondition. The starting point is Kant's belief that human nature is corrupt, but capable of improvement on both the social and the individual level. But this improvement, which is the proper aim of politics, and especially any improvement in peace and harmony, internal or external, requires mutual trust among people. Iniits turn, this requires justice, not as a "despotic morality". seeking right at all costs, but as a commitment to human rights, to keeping promises, not punishing without trial and not waging any aggressive war. Above all, it requires the avoidance of acting on any maxim involving an aim which could
not succeed if it were made public. The paper will argue that Kant's view is in general to be supported, but it will argue against one application, namely Kant's belief that the aim of removing a "tyrant" from office could not be made public. In reply it will be argued that a constitution which provides for the removal of a ruler from office if the ruler grossly violates human rights is not a contradiction in terms, especially if one agrees with the "neo-Kantian" view (not that of Kant himself) that law, not people, should be sovereign
