If You Can’t Give Me Everything: Trilogues and Dilemmas of Accountability

This paper assesses to what extent trilogues affect possibilities to hold decision-makers to account. Trilogues are defended because they provide settings where decision-makers can negotiate and discuss more freely, contributing to efficiency and effectiveness. But they are also criticised for hindering open and inclusive decision-making processes, excluding Union citizens from accessing relevant documents and debates. Does this mean that the improvement of internal accountability comes at the expense of external accountability towards citizens? We investigate this question by comparing how three EP-committees – ECON, ENVI and INTA – have attempted to remedy the critique of trilogues. We argue that efforts to enhance internal accountability through internal control mechanisms such as mandates and reporting back procedures have done little by way of external accountability. However, although trilogues challenge the democratic accountability of EU legislative processes, constitutional accountability is secured by hindering power concentration and abuse.