Inside the 'Black Box' of Trilogues

Abstract

This is one out of two proposed panels on trilogues. European Union decision-making has increasingly moved from publicly visible venues towards secluded settings in which new laws are effectively decided (Farrell and Héritier 2004, Héritier and Reh 2012, Brandsma 2015). Presently, around 90% of new European laws are fast-tracked, with political compromises mostly found behind closed doors in so-called ‘trilogue meetings’ between representatives of the European Parliament (EP), Council, and Commission (European Parliament 2017). Trilogues have become the ‘new normal’ of EU law-making as a way of reaching legislative compromises and have sparked significant controversy. Without any reference in the treaties but used across a very broad spectrum of issues, secluded trilogues offer a provocative contrast to the logic of ‘public control’ touted in the EU treaties (Curtin and Leino 2017). Though growing, the body of scholarship on trilogues remains patchy. Scholars have identified and underscored the relevance of trilogues since they first emerged in the early 2000s, but there is still relatively little that we know about this form of bicameral conflict resolution. Research has focused on the institutionalization of trilogues, their occurrence, the behaviour of the EP negotiating team and bargaining success (e.g. Héritier and Reh 2012, Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2015, Rasmussen and Reh 2013). But significant knowledge gaps remain with respect to actors inside trilogues and outside, seeking to influence them. Two panels are proposed, with this panel addressing the ‘insiders’ and the other the ‘outsiders’. In this panel, we propose four papers on actors inside trilogues that hitherto have been largely neglected. The first paper (Brandsma et al.) focuses on the Council of Ministers, which has received considerably less attention than the European Parliament. This paper looks at mandating and accountability processes between the Presidency of the Council and the member states with a view to trilogue negotiations. The second paper (Ripoll Servent and Panning) investigates the role of Eurosceptic MEPs who, mostly as shadow rapporteurs, are part of the EPs negotiating team. The third paper (Laloux) looks at the parliament’s negotiator, and investigates how it deviates from the mandate issued by the EP committee and which factors drive this deviation. The final paper (Rosén and Stie) looks at the accountability relationship between the EP's negotiator and its committee.

Title	Details
Trilogues and the Council: Disrupting the Diplomatic Culture	View Paper Details
Engaging the disengaged? Explaining the participation of Eurosceptic MEPs in trilogue negotiations	View Paper Details
If You Can’t Give Me Everything: Trilogues and Dilemmas of Accountability	View Paper Details