Rent distribution and coalition-building in autocracies

Despite the advance of democracy around the world, authoritarian regimes by no means step aside, and cooptation has proved to be crucial for upholding the status quo. Yet, since polities are multi-actor settings while resources are not infinite, the government has to optimize rent distribution. Arguably, regime survival hinges on how the government deals with social groups by means of redistributive policies, which in turn renders cooptation more or less likely. Following existing politico-economic formal models, we ask "What is the effective strategy of rent distribution and when is it conducive to the status quo?" We compose a game-theoretic model where the regime decides on the taxation of two subject groups, wealthy elite and poor masses, given exogenous parameters such as inequality, ideational/ideological proximity, and non-tax budget revenue, among others. We further test model implications using cross-country panel data.