How EU Officials' Characteristics influence Infringement Proceeding Outcomes

Infringement proceedings serve as a key legal mechanism through which the European Union (EU) enforces compliance with common laws among its member states. This article examines how the nationality and partisanship of EU officials influence the outcomes of these proceedings. We argue that both Directors General and Commissioners face a principal–agent dilemma, as they simultaneously act as EU officials and as nationals of their home countries. We argue that infringement proceedings are less likely to advance when they are overseen by EU officials who share the nationality of the member state under investigation. We further posit that officials’ partisan affiliations may also shape the outcomes of such cases. Using a novel dataset covering 19,352 infringement proceedings between 2002 and 2020, we find evidence of a nationality bias, however, only among Commissioners. By contrast, we find no indication of bias linked to ideology or partisanship.