Coalition Partner Has Entered the Chat: Delegation and Oversight in Debates in the Council of the EU

Multiparty governments face severe delegation problems in policymaking. While recent work shows that these problems also arise at the European level, we still know little about how they affect ministerial behavior in EU negotiations. This paper argues that policy divides and oversight within coalitions are crucial for understanding ministerial behavior in the Council of the EU. Because Council negotiations offer participants information advantages and opportunities for policy drift vis-à-vis their coalition partners, some ministers stand to gain more from the negotiations than others. To safeguard against this, sidelined coalition partners can employ oversight to monitor or constrain ministers. Analyzing participation in over 1,000 meetings and speeches in nearly 400 debates, I find that ministers from highly divided coalitions are more likely to participate, speak, and pursue drift -- unless constrained by coalition oversight. The findings have important implications for our understanding of EU policymaking, multi-level politics, and coalition politics.