Coalition Accountability. A Two-Stage Process from Electoral Performance into Government and Power

This study investigates coalition accountabilitythe extent to which incumbents electoral performance influences coalition outcomes, specifically the distribution of policy-making power through portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. While existing research often questions whether voters can effectively sanction or reward in- cumbent coalition parties, we argue that properly assessing coalition accountability requires modeling a two-stage process: (1) incumbents reentry into government and (2) the subsequent allocation of portfolios. Because changes in portfolio allocation are necessarily conditional on incumbents returning to office, we employ a Heckman selection model. The results show that changes in vote shares affect both the like- lihood that incumbents reenter government and the degree to which their portfolio shares are adjusted. These effects vary depending on the conflict type that led to the termination of the previous government. A closer examination reveals that vote losses significantly decrease an incumbent partys probability of rejoining a coalition, whereas both vote gains and losses substantially shape how portfolios are redistributed among those incumbents that do return to office.