When Bribery Feels Justified: Experimental Evidence on Robin Hood Bias and Bribery Among Peruvian Students

Corruption and socioeconomic inequality perpetuate a vicious cycle, amplified by psychosocial factors that drive corrupt behavior. This study broadens the traditional economic view of corruption by integrating the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to examine the Robin Hood bias: the rationalization of corrupt acts where bribery is more justified in a prosocial scenario. Using two online vignette experiments about corrupt exchanges in the public sector and applied with undergraduate students (Study 1: N = 375; Study 2: N = 296), we examined how bribe amount (high vs. low), risk perception, and bribe redistribution scenario (Selfish vs. Prosocial) interact with political moral laxity (PML), social dominance orientation (SDO), public service motivation (PSM), and dark personality traits to explain the probability of accepting a bribe, the proportion in which the bribe is distributed, and the justification attributed to corrupt acts. In Study 1, tolerance to corruption was higher in Selfish scenarios, while Prosocial scenarios elicited greater justification, particularly for low amounts. Structural equation models (SEM) showed that PML and Machiavellianism predicted tolerance to corruption, while PSM had a dual role: Self-sacrifice reduced Selfish bribery, but Commitment to public values increased justification when bribery was framed as Prosocial. Study 2 introduced risk perception and revealed that high-risk in Prosocial scenarios increased altruistic allocation and justification, suggesting that Prosocial narratives enable moral licensing even under sanction threats. Subclinical psychopathy consistently predicted Selfish allocation, while Narcissism interacted with risk to reduce altruism. PSM again showed both protective and distorted effects, depending on context. Corruption is sustained not only by rational incentives but also by redistributive narratives that legitimize deviance, underscoring the need for anti-corruption strategies that reshape moral interpretations of public interest alongside strengthening institutional enforcement.